Gravity in Ovid’s Metamorphoses…

In Plato’s Phaedrus…

In The Blues Brothers…

 And its Moral and Spiritual (i.e. Mythical) Signification…

     Before we quite leave the earth’s gravitational orbit (figuratively, but also literally, as we’ll see momentarily), let me draw your attention to two other ancient mythic expressions of the same physical reality, and one modern one, all fecund with the kind of meaning that is entirely beyond the scope and capacity of empirical science.

My first example comes from Ovid, one of the most sophisticated writers who ever held a pen. Ovid’s cosmogony at the beginning of The Metamorphoses remains a seminal text, without the reading of which no one escapes my classroom.

It is utterly traditional in describing the creation of the world as the ordering by God of a pre-existent material chaos in which the elemental opposites have invaded each other’s proper territory, and are in a more or less permanent state of war.  God, or Nature, Ovid writes, composes this strife, separating the aggressors, assigning each of them to its own province, and binding them fast “in harmony”.

This is how the Roman poet describes this ordering process:

The fiery weightless element that forms heaven’s vault leaped up and made place for itself upon the topmost height.  Next came the air in lightness and in place.  The earth was heavier than all, and, drawing with it the grosser elements, sank to the very bottom of the universe by its own weight.  The streaming water took its place last, and held the solid land confined in its embrace.

I’ll come back to this passage shortly, but clearly Ovid knows a thing or two about the modern theory of gravitation.

My second example comes, somewhat paradoxically, from Plato.  Paradoxically, because in The Republic, as you know, Plato affects to be a strict constructionist of philosophical truth, and therefore banishes the lying poets from his ideal city.  What rather mitigates Plato’s criticism of poetry, allegory, and myth, however, is his own penchant for quoting Homer, and his prolific imagination, which confabulates innumerable allegorical myths as a means of explaining the invisible, incorporeal realities (God, the Ideas, the Soul) which apparently could not otherwise be explained than in those ostensibly false, and so forbidden, sensual images in which poetry traffics.

Plato’s ubiquitous reliance upon poetic figure, myth, and allegory (e.g., the allegory of the cave and the myth of Er in the very Republic from which he banishes the poets; the figure of the charioteer in the Phaedrus, to name only a few) suggests that his antipathy to the supposed falsity and sensuality of poetry is hardly to be taken literally.  (But then the opposition between philosophical truth and poetic fiction, science and myth, is a conventional and continuous topos in Western literature, discussion of which will have to be postponed for another course.)

In the Phaedrus, Plato compares the human soul to a pair of winged horses driven by a charioteer.  In its perfect, pre-lapsarian state, he says, the soul soars freely amongst the heavens, the habitation of the Ideas and the gods, borne upward upon wings that are the element within man most akin to the immortal divine.  In the supernal regions, the wings of the soul are nourished upon the eternal and incorporeal Ideas, but when the soul conceives a foul affection for the material and transitory goods and pleasures of this world, and when she gives in to these lower passions, her wings begin to waste away, and she droops in flight.  In due course, after her wings have thus completely atrophied, she at last settles on the solid earth, and finding a home there, contentedly receives an earthly body.

 

The first thing one notices about both Ovid’s and Plato’s mythic narratives is that the empirical fact of gravity can only be described by them in expressly moral and religious language. Ovid characterizes the earth (the heaviest of the four elements) as “foul” (sordidus) and “gross” (densus).   It is, in Hamlet’s later description of the earthly element in man, “O…too, too solid/sullied”.

Under its own weight, the Earth sinks to the very bottom of the universe, the farthest, that is, from the lucid and weightless heavens, and functions there as a sort of cosmic dust bin, catching all the flotsam and jetsam that drains into it.  This is not an auspicious habitat for man.

Ovidian man, in fact, is an exile, a “stranger and pilgrim” on the earth, to use the language of Paul’s letter to the Hebrews, always “mindful of” and seeking the “better, that is, the heavenly country” whence he came.  For Ovid, that which is essential and original in man’s nature, the “true man”, as Plato called it, is the incorporeal soul.

In his account of man’s creation (to which we will return in greater detail later), Ovid conceives of the human soul as a displaced fragment or spark of the Divine Fire, first stolen by Prometheus from heaven, and then breathed into the inanimate lump of clay that had been shaped by this arch-sculptor into the human body.  That body is thus the human correlative of the cosmic prima materia: it is a formless chaos until it is animated by the Soul of God, just as the cosmos is a formless chaos until Nature or God informs it with order.

Man walks erect, as Ovid goes on to explain—and we note that homo erectus is another important datum of modern evolutionary science, pre-empted by the mythic imagination—because his re-ascent to his heavenly home depends upon his morally and intellectually fixing his gaze, throughout his earthly sojourn, upon the divine region of his birth.

Which leads me, finally, to my modern example of a myth about gravity and how to defy it.  It comes from an intermittently inspired piece of cinematic art, the 1970s film starring John Belushi and Dan Ackroyd entitled The Blues Brothers.

At the beginning of the scene in question, Jake (the Belushi character) is standing reluctantly in the narthex of a church, having just been collected from the prison gate in the new Bluesmobile by brother Ellwood, who has shepherded him there for his reformation.  Suddenly, Jake’s body is bathed in, transfigured by, the celestial Light of Revelation.  “I have seen the light; I have seen the light”, he proclaims, somewhat redundantly.

The light he has seen is the idea to get the band back together, and to earn thereby the money necessary to pay the back-taxes on the orphanage where the brothers were raised.  Meanwhile, in the church itself, a prayer service is being led in the style of an old Negro revival meeting, by James Brown.

Preacher Brown and the choir are singin’ and gyratin’ to the exuberant praises of the Lord, and the infection is soon caught by the congregation.  They begin dancing in the aisles, and soon in the rafters, to which they have been propelled by the energy of the indwelling Spirit.

In mid-air, they perform long and lazy somersaults and other acrobatic maneuvers, as if they had broken completely free of the earth’s gravitational orbit.  And indeed they have.  Filled with the Holy Spirit, they are enjoying the state of enthousiasmos (to use the language of the ancient pagan mystery cults); they are entheoi, possessed by God.

In the more appropriate Christian language of St. Paul, they have “put off mortality” and “put on immortality”; they have become no longer earthly and carnal creatures, but new spiritual and heavenly beings, for whom gravity and the other laws of nature no longer apply.  And though Belushi and Ackroyd are sending up–sorry, another gravitational pun–a certain kind of modern American religion, be assured that its roots go back to the mists of pre-history, when human consciousness meant mythic consciousness.

Myth as Meaning…

Myth vs. History…

vs. Science…

Mythic Universality and Recurrence…

     For the ancients, then, mystery and myth always lay just beneath the surface of the visible order. This is to say that it was in the subterranean stratum of mystery and myth that the hidden intelligible meaning of natural phenomena and historical events—actualities that were, in themselves, meaningless—was found.

This is one reason why Aristotle wrote (in the ninth book of his Poetics) that myth is a somewhat more “philosophical” genre than history.   History records, as Aristotle explains, what actually happened to this or that particular person, in this or that place and time, once and for all.  Myth, on the other hand, is the record of what happens in all times and places, recurrently, everywhere, and always.

In Greek ontological terms, then, history belongs to the mutable and particular sphere of existence (which Plato and his followers regarded as an inferior or spurious order of being), whereas myth refers to a universal, eternally recurrent, and therefore unchanging Reality.  The historian Herodotus might thus chronicle the rise and fall of Croesus’ Lydia, or of the Persian Empire; a Thucydides, the rise and fall of Sparta; a Livy, Carthage; a Gibbons, Rome.  But as soon as one speaks of a king’s or nation’s “rise and fall”, one is using the language of myth, not history.  One is observing one of history’s universally and eternally recurrent patterns, on the model of the mythic journey of the Sun, or the pitiless rotation of Fortune’s Wheel.

Historical events can be observed and natural phenomena measured, but Meaning, of course, is an entirely incorporeal and invisible entity.  To search for it beneath the visible currents of history or sensible things is thus to take a great leap of faith, whether in the name of religion or science.

Like the religious postulate of the Divine, the quest for meaning at any level involves the projection of the interpreter’s own Intelligence into an inanimate and therefore unintelligent world. The only difference is that, where the pre-modern imagination used to call that Intelligence “God”, the scientific imagination now depersonalizes it as the Laws of Motion, or of Thermodynamics, or Gravitation, or Relativity, or String Theory.

But it is, all the same, a projection and a leap of faith.

 

I know nothing, of course, about physics, but my ignorance at least allows me to observe that the modern scientific theories of magnetism and gravity are, whether actually true or not, re-assertions of the ancient mythic representation of God as (in Aristotle’s famous designation) an “Unmoved Mover”.  God, according to this ancient mythic image, is the stationary lodestone, the unmoving Centre, that draws everything in the cosmos back to Himself, maintains all things in their obedient orbit, and prevents them from flying off under their own eccentric energies into space.

As for String Theory, I recall that it was Pythagoras who first noted that the universe pulsates with a certain mystical music, caused by the silent vibration of invisible strings, whose division according to certain ratios holds the key to the secret mathematical structure of the cosmos.

Of course, I recognize the superior practical utility of science to myth.  Newton’s law of gravitation enables us to predict and therefore to control nature.  If we know the weight of a circus acrobat and the height from which he jumps onto a teeter-totter below, and we know the weight of the person standing on the other end, we can calculate how fast and how high the latter will be propelled into the air.  This is useful–indeed, life-saving–information, at least for the acrobat who needs to be assured that his landing platform is set at the right height.

But utility aside, the law of gravitation is ultimately unsatisfying.  For starters, it is hardly as beautiful as the profoundly paradoxical idea of God as an Unmoved and Unmoving Mover, nor does it really explain any better what this thing called “gravity” is, why it is a necessary condition of our universe, or how its necessity came about.  In that regard, the mythic mystery of the Immutable Divine Centre is infinitely more provocative and meaningful.

Since the dawn of the twentieth century, words have been especially susceptible to the hammer blows of fashion and ideological propaganda.   The all-time master word-smiths (in the sense of my metallurgical metaphor—i.e., forgers of language) have been the leaders and apparatchiks of the former Soviet Union, who knew all too well that the abuse of power begins with the abuse of ordinary discourse. The Soviet Ministry of Information could always be depended upon to disseminate misinformation. As in Orwell’s Animal Farm or Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, war in Communist-Speak meant peace, peace meant war, wealth meant poverty, the dictatorship of the proletariat meant servitude, national liberation meant colonial enslavement, democracy meant tyranny.

Notwithstanding the collapse of the Soviet Empire, it is astounding how many of the perverted usages of International Communism have survived and conquered the supposedly victorious West, where they continue to be employed by the intellectual elites with much the same meaning, and absolutely no sense of irony, embarrassment, or regret.

The first three entries on the current list belong to this category. The next two exemplify the remarkable illiteracy of contemporary journalists. Then follow a few of the more amusing errors in contemporary usage.

 

  1. Progressive

“Progressive” is one of those terms of self-congratulation that have become popular, by no mere coincidence, since the beginning of the Me-Generation . It is the descriptor by which individuals and movements on the Left universally compliment themselves, notwithstanding that “progressive” was the quasi-official adjective used in the propaganda of the USSR to describe Soviet policy (e.g., the internment of dissenters in concentration camps, which, one supposes, was necessary for the “progress” of the Revolution). In the same way, post-Soviet “progressives” reason that multi-generational welfare-dependency, larger deficits, and the relentless growth of government and its powers, also contribute to “progress”.

One can’t argue with progress, of course; it follows that no one can argue with the proposals of “progressives”.   Those who do so are “reactionaries”, who presumably espouse such ideas and policies as they do only because they think and hope that they will make things worse.

  1. Liberal

“Liberal” derives from the Latin adjective liber, meaning “free”. In the eighteenth century, a “liberal” was an advocate of the freedom of the individual, and especially, of his freedom from the tyranny of the State. By contrast, liberals today (as opposed to libertarians) invariably believe in government as a power for good, if not the solution to all our problems. In truth, they ought to call themselves “illiberals”; but like “progressive”, “liberal” is another term of self-approbation. Today, the only real “liberals” are reactionaries.

  1. Compassion and Greed

For liberals and progressives, “compassion” means being generous to the less fortunate, with other people’s money. Those few who now produce their own wealth, do not depend upon government (i.e., the taxpayer) for their sustenance, and wish to keep what they have earned, are “greedy”. All wealthy capitalists are greedy, except for Hollywood liberals, activist pop stars, and the fabulously—stratospherically–wealthy such as Bill Gates, George Soros, and Warren Buffett, all of whom advocate higher taxes for the “rich”, having already found a way not to pay them, or having so much money that raising taxes makes little difference to them. Members of public sector unions, government bureaucrats, community activists, arts groups, welfare recipients, and all other professional sucklings at the public breast (i.e., those who live at the expense of wealth-producing capitalists), when they demand higher wages, increased State funding, or more generous welfare benefits, are, by contrast, never greedy, but only appealing to the minimum standards of social justice and compassion.

  1. Cheek by Tongue, Tongue in Jowl,…Whatever

Commenting on the extraordinary architectural density of Lunenburg, N.S., the narrator of a TVO documentary observed that the houses had been built “teeth by jowl”.

  1. His and Hers

From an AP report in The National Post, Sat., June 28:

An official with the conservative Tea Party movement who was charged with conspiring to take photos of the wife of Mississippi Senator Thad Cochrane in her nursing home apparently killed himself Friday, police said, days after her husband beat off right-wing challenger Christ McDaniel to win the Republican primary… 

He “killed himself…days after her husband beat off right-wing challenger…”? Even in this age of same-sex marriage, “he” can’t be married to “her husband”.  Confused? So was I on the first several readings. The problem is the rather distant antecedent of “her”. But coherence is not to be hoped for from a graduate of journalism school.

  1. Grow

Every politician promises to “grow the economy”.  In terms of usage, this ugly phrase demonstrates that more and more people are now tone-deaf to idiom: i.e., the sometimes arbitrary and unfortunate fact that, in every language, certain words go together and others don’t. You can grow soybeans, roses, hair, a beard, a tail, or wings; you can grow proud, lazy, rich, tall, fat, or simply grow.   But you can’t “grow” an economy.

  1. Reticent

“Reticent” means “taciturn”, “inclined to silence”, or “reluctant to communicate”.   One can be reticent (i.e., reluctant) in relation to speech, but not action. When did reticent become a universal synonym for hesitant?

  1. Deep-seeded”

A recurrent malapropism for “deep-seated” that has spread tap-roots everywhere. One can, I suppose, sow seeds deeply (yielding “deep-seeded” crops), but the intended locution, “deep-seated”, has a different meaning.

Myth and Mystery…

The De-mythologizing and De-mystifying Valency of Science…

     In our own time, Joseph Campbell has eloquently restated the problem, and the paradox, of myth:

The forms of sensibility and the categories of human thought…so confine the mind that it is normally impossible, not only to see, but even to conceive, beyond the colorful, fluid, infinitely various and bewildering phenomenal spectacle.

Yet, as Campbell continues,

The function of ritual and myth is to make possible, and then to facilitate, the jump–by analogy.  Forms and conceptions that the mind and its senses can comprehend are presented and arranged in such a way as to suggest a truth or openness beyond.  And then, the conditions for meditation having been provided, the individual is left alone.  Myth is but the penultimate; the ultimate is openness–that void, or being, beyond the categories–into which the mind must plunge alone and be dissolved.  Therefore, God and the gods are only convenient means–themselves of the nature of the world of names and forms, though eloquent of, and ultimately, conducive to, the ineffable.  They are mere symbols to move and awaken the mind, and to call it past themselves.

Myths are self-transcending fictions; by means of provisional, approximative, and manifestly inadequate symbols and images, they point beyond themselves to a transcendent, divine order which, as Plato described it in the Timaeus, is “impossible to know or express”.

For such reasons, the ancients described the myths as “mysteries”.  We are all familiar with the popular meaning of that word:  something difficult or impossible to understand or explain, because it is unusual, paradoxical, or even miraculous.  But in antiquity and the Middle Ages, the noun mysterium was rather more exalted in meaning than in its current pauperized usage.

The festival of Christmas, for instance–or what the de-mythologizing and demystifying fanatics of political correctness insist on calling the Holiday Season—was conventionally understood as the celebration of the first of the two central “mysteries” upon which the Christian religion is founded:  the Incarnation, i.e., the descent of the eternal, incorporeal, and invisible God into the flesh and the world of space and time.

As the text of the Christmas motet begins, “O magnum mysterium, et admirabile sacramentum” (O great mystery, and wondrous sacrament).  The text is instructive:  its more or less synonymous conjunction of the words “mystery” and “sacrament” tells us something rather important for our present purposes.

In popular modern usage, as I’ve said, one might call any phenomenon that is difficult to comprehend or explain a mystery:  for instance, the mystery of flight (as folks at the beginning of the last century used quaintly to refer to that cutting-edge technology), or of calculus, or (to continue to list things I’ll never understand), the mystery of the golf swing, or the mystery of the popularity of the Liberal Party in Canada.

But in the pre-modern imagination, the word “mystery” was reserved for an entity or event that was not merely incomprehensible but also experienced as sacred, as a sacramentum; and indeed the mystery—the incomprehensibility and wonder—of it was inseparable from its sacredness. Everything that is mysterious is sacred:  ordained by God, a manifestation of God, or a concealment of God; and everything that is sacred is by necessity mysterious.

 

That mystery is rooted in the Divine was the universal attitude of the pre-modern.  As modern anthropologists have defined it, the mark of the primitive psyche is to invest with—to project upon—everything in nature that is inexplicable to it, a consciousness and a will, indeed, a personality very much like its own (only rather more powerful and therefore more dangerous).  Every important event in the life of the tribesman or the  history of the tribe, every anomaly in the natural order (earthquake, flood, birth, an unexpectedly bountiful harvest) was conceived as the effect of God’s inscrutable and capricious beneficence or displeasure.

When what we call “Science” finally intervened to explain these events, it could only do so, of course, by ascribing them to purely physical causes, that is,  by de-mystifying them.  Science, in due course, expunged from the universe every trace of Soul or Mind or God.  The inscrutable living Spirit that was formerly and from time immemorial thought to reside at the centre of, to animate and govern everything that exists and occurs in the world, was pronounced dead, and the de-spirited carcass of the cosmos assumed thereafter to be moved by the cold hand of mechanical law.

Here, again, is one of the most obvious differences between the modern and pre-modern outlooks.  If the ancient reflex was to multiply and aggrandize mystery, the modern project is to diminish and ultimately abolish it.

From the end of the eighteenth century to the present, nonetheless, Science, and scientific criticism, have tended to pronounce the death of mystery and God with a dogmatic excess of certitude and materialistic zeal.  “Scientific” critics of the Bible, for instance, have told us, with overweening confidence, that the parting of the waters of the Red Sea during the Exodus was the result of no miraculous intervention by God, but is merely the dim folk memory of a freak drought or unusually low tide, abetted perhaps by a sudden windstorm.  This is a nice bit of modern rationalization, but as such it is of course wholly beside the point.  To reduce a religious mystery to a meteorological event, and explain that event in accordance with the principles of natural causation, is to completely misapprehend it.

As any student of mythology knows, the parting of the Red Sea didn’t happen, at least not in the sensible world of space and time; it is poetry, not history, symbol not fact.  The very point of the story is mythic and symbolic:  to demonstrate the majestic power of the God of Israel, who with a “mighty hand and an outstretched arm” (in the words the writer of Exodus) shepherded his people out of bondage in Egypt and into the Promised Land, just as he would later liberate them from captivity in Babylon and greater Persia; as he would be beseeched to liberate them again from the Empires of Greece and Rome; and as eventually he would release all mankind from bondage to Satan, sin, and death.

The Israelites’ passing over dry-shod of the Red Sea is, beyond that, an only subtly veiled historical transcription of the ancient mythologem of the nocturnal death and matutinal resurrection of the Ancient Near Eastern sun-god, who every night set in the western sky and descended into the waters of the underworld sea, there to encounter the chaos-dragon Tiamat, or Apophis, or Rahab, or Leviathan (all historicized by the Hebrew biblical authors as the evil Pharaoh), to conquer him and deliver from his belly the captive dead into the light of salvation.

This, as we will see, is one of the foundational and recurrent myths that govern the whole course of the so-called “history” of the Judaeo-Christian Bible.

Mythic Archetypes…

The Philosophers’ Critique of Myth…

     What I’ve said about the great cycle of mythology known as the Matter of Troy can be said about most of the other mythic cycles or archetypes, which inspired elaboration after elaboration down the centuries.  There are, of course, any number of explicitly mythological poems, such as Marlowe’s Hero and Leander, Shakespeare’s Venus and Adonis, or Dryden’s Fables.  But even more characteristic of the pre-modern imagination is the velleity to translate non-mythological subjects into mythopoetic idioms.  In his famous poem Lycidas, for example, an elegy written to commemorate the drowning death of Milton’s friend Edward King, the poet identifies King with the ancient dying and reviving gods Thammuz, Osiris, Dionysos, Orpheus, and Christ, thereby eternizing and universalizing what would otherwise have been an affecting, but merely personal, narrative.

Such mythic transpositions and displacements are too numerous to list, so I’ll give you only three more examples.  The Egyptian and Babylonian myth of the killing of the maritime dragon recrudesces, as we’ll see, in the biblical account of creation, informs the entire Judaeo-Christian salvation history, is the central narrative of the Christian sacrament of baptism, and is given new life by Melville in his novel Moby Dick.  The ancient mythologem of the Golden Age informs every page of  Thomas More’s Utopia, Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, and  Rousseau’s and Margaret Mead’s risible fantasies about “noble savages”.  Everything from the Grail legend, to the medieval romance of Gawain and the Green Knight, to Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner, to  Eliot’s Wasteland, bears the imprint of the myths of the Ancient Near Eastern and classical dying and reviving gods of the seasons and the vegetation.  And even our fashionable hysteria about the obliteration of the planet as a consequence of “global warming” is an unconscious re-assertion of the ancient Stoic eschatological myth about the destruction of the world in a universal conflagration.

 

Jung has called the archetypes of myth “controlling images”, and indeed, the human psyche does seem to be predisposed to organize and represent the raw data of existence according to these primordial mythic paradigms and categories.  But that is a subject for another course, and even if one is not persuaded by Jung, there are other, simpler explanations of why myth is the default mode of the human imagination.

Since what I have called the human conversation has always revolved around the permanent questions about existence and reality, the resort to myth, as we’ll see in a moment, is practically inevitable.

Does God exist?  Where does he come from?  What is his nature?  What does he want?

Does the soul exist?  Is it created, or has it transmigrated, with Shirley McLaine, from some other realm?  What is its nature?  What does it want?

What is birth, death, rebirth?  Is there an afterlife?

What is the nature of the world?  How has it come into being?  Or has it always existed?  How will it end?  Or will it infinitely endure?

What is the nature of man?  Where did he come from?  Where is he going to?  What are good and evil?  Why does evil exist?  What is the purpose and meaning of life?

These perennial metaphysical questions and their solutions are ultimately beyond direct human experience, comprehension, or expression; and this is, paradoxically, why they must be posited and posed by the mythic psyche.

As a prisoner of time and space, man’s imagination is constrained by the sensual and finite framework of his worldly and corporeal existence, through which he is constrained to conceive of and represent such transcendent realities– God, the soul, the afterlife–as are by definition beyond sense and time.   Myth and poetry are, of course, just such sensual and limited categories– so rankly sensual, in fact, that Plato banished the poets from his enlightened Republic.

When he did so, the criticism of poetry and myth on those grounds was already a century old.  The Pre-Socratic philosophers Heracleitus and Xenophanes had indignantly accused the poets in general, and Homer in particular, of having insulted the dignity of the ineffable Godhead in their absurd depictions of the Olympian deities in the corporeal habit and with all of the moral and psychological fallibilities of men.

Such crude anthropomorphisms suggested to them that myth was the least likely modality through which the human imagination could possibly transcend its own existential limitations.

The Matter of Troy…

 The Obligation of the Poet to “hand the matter on”…

     I’ve called this course “The Vocabulary of Myth”, and grandly described its purpose in the Calendar of Priceton University as to furnish the basic “grammar” of the human imagination down to the eighteenth century.  I must leave aside the question of why the eighteenth century sounded the death-knell of man’s mythic consciousness—my chronology is arbitrary, in any case–on the assumption that forty-eight centuries out of fifty of civilized man’s pre-occupation with mythological forms of expression represents something enduring and significant, and not to be discounted or discarded on the basis of a mere two-century-long cultural anomaly.  So, I return, unapologetically, to my description.

In this context, words such as “vocabulary” and “grammar” are metaphors, of course, poetic figures—myths, in fact, since for the Greeks poesis and mythos were synonyms—by means of which I am attempting to express the idea that mythology has always been the principal well-spring from which the basic themes of the human conversation have  bubbled up.  Let me try to prove to you that that is true, and more than merely figuratively so.  I’ll start with what is dismissed by the modern mind—at least that of my undergraduates–as the least consequential aspect of civilization, poetry, and move on to religion, philosophy, and science.

As a matter of both tradition and empirical fact, there are two grand themes, two great bodies of stories, that have been subject to endless restatement and elaboration throughout the centuries of Western literature and art from antiquity right down to our own time.  The first of these is the salvation history of the Judaeo-Christian Bible, a body of narrative whose relationship to myth will be discussed in what follows, and whose centrality to the Western Tradition requires no proof.

The second is “the Matter of Troy” (as it was called in the Middle Ages):  the story of the Trojan War and its aftermath, including the maritime adventures and homecomings (nostoi) of the Greek heroes Odysseus, Agamemnon, and Menelaus, but more generally including the entire cycle of Greek mythology whose great fountainhead was Homer’s two epic poems, the Iliad, or story of Troy (Ilion in Greek), and the Odyssey, which records the wanderings of Odysseus.  The Odyssey was thus the first successful sequel in the history of popular fiction, and its continuing influence illustrates Northrop Frye’s abiding principle about the genesis of  literature:  that it is simply made out of other literature.

As another eminent literary critic, C.S. Lewis, has characterized them, writers before the modern age were “bookish”; they felt no compunction about, indeed, only felt justified in, recapitulating the narrative themes and traditions of the great auctores who lived before them, and whose auctoritas they revered and borrowed.  As they themselves saw it, their principal vocation was to “hand the matter on” (in Lewis’ formulation), the “matter” being whatever narrative theme or tradition they had inherited gratefully from their ancient “authors”.  (Here, notably, the Christian writers of the Middle Ages and thereafter showed no diminution of reverence because those authors were pagan).   Once in the possession of a great theme, it would never have occurred to them to invent something out of whole cloth; indeed, they would have regarded the modern artistic fetish for “originality” as the symptom of a profound cultural poverty.

 

The Odyssey itself thus unleashed a deluge of imitations, extrapolations, and continuations, right down to James Joyce’s Ulysses in the early part of the twentieth century.  The first of such were the anonymous “Trojan Cycle”, or “Homerica”, as they were called, that anthology of five or six minor epics written by the “Homeridae” (figurative “sons of Homer”) from the seventh through the fifth centuries B.C., with the ostensible purpose of filling in the gaps in the record of the Trojan war and the journeys and adventures of the returning Greek heroes that their adoptive literary father, the great bard, might have left out.

Greek drama was similarly a gap-filling child of Homer:  the first Greek trilogy, Aeschylus’ Oresteia, tells the tragic story of the murder of Agamemnon upon his return from Troy at the hands of his treacherous wife Clytemnestra and her paramour Aegisthus, Agamemnon’s own brother (with the Homeric theme–comic, in the ancient sense of the word–of Odysseus’ happy return to the side of his ever faithful Penelope in mind).  It then records the tormented resolve of Agamemnon’s young son Orestes to avenge his father’s death.  (Shakespeare’s Hamlet borrows heavily from it.)

Following the Trojan Cycle and the Greek drama, the next and by far the most important Homeric continuation was Virgil’s epic the Aeneid, which recounts the escape of the Trojan prince Aeneas from the burning city of Troy, and his wanderings and adventures at sea, where he encounters, by no mere coincidence, many of the same mythological monsters and temptresses from whom Homer’s Odysseus had escaped.  In book VI of Virgil’s epic, Aeneas descends into the underworld, just as Homer’s hero had done in book XI of the Odyssey, and navigates an already familiar infernal landscape.  Landing finally on the western shores of Italy, he launches a protracted siege against the local inhabitants that follows all of the stages of the Greek campaign against Troy, until he emerges victorious and founds there the city of Rome.

The Aeneid was written in the last decades before Christ to provide the civilization of Rome, and the incipient Empire inaugurated by Caesar Augustus (under whom the poem was penned), with an appropriately grand mythological pre-history and divine pedigree.   Such is the authority of the Homeric mythological tradition that from then on it became de rigeur for every people and nation to trace its ancestry, as did Virgil’s Romans, to one or other of the escaping heroes of Troy.

Thus, according to the twelfth-century historian Geoffrey of Monmouth, the island of Britain was discovered by an eponymous founder named Brutus, another Trojan prince who (though wholly unmentioned by either Homer or Virgil) spent many years lost at sea before finally finding safe harbour on another western shore and founding there a new nation by divine destiny.  In due course, within a half century or so, two Welsh poets, Wace and Layamon, composed (one in Latin, the other in Welsh) consecutive epics about Brutus’ wanderings and fathering of the British people, both separately entitled Brut.  (But besides the epic “Bruts”, several other poems were written in the Christian Middle Ages under the apparently pressing moral and artistic obligation to hand on the matter of Troy:  the French Roman de Troie of one Benoit of St. Maur, for example, and another anonymous French Roman d’Aeneas.) 

Everyone knows the next and most important of the medieval poems in debt to Homer and his literary progeny:  Dante’s Divine Comedy.  It is, of course, the shade of Virgil himself who acts as Dante’s guide through the underworld, a descent that is explicitly modeled on that of Aeneas into Hades in Aeneid VI, which was modeled on that of Odysseus in Odyssey XI.

One could adduce any number of other examples of works by medieval sons of Homer.  In the late-fourteenth century, Chaucer wrote his romantic epic Troilus and Criseyde, Troilus being another Prince of Troy belatedly thrust into the limelight, though scarcely mentioned by Homer or Virgil.  Chaucer’s story of Troilus was, in turn, handed on to Shakespeare, who made a splendid tragedy of it, and so it went, on and on.

Long, long before the structuralists, post-structuralists, semioticians, and deconstructionists made the discovery that there is an often tenuous relationship between words and what they signify (taking possession of the academic sandbox ever since), their dubeity was already old-hat. The Sophists of the fifth century B.C. were doubtful that words could have fixed and objective meanings, until Plato answered them. The Skeptics, Cynics, and Stoics reaffirmed the old sophistical reservations, until the Middle and Neo-Platonists answered them. In the high Middle Ages, the problem of language reasserted itself in the controversies between the so-called Nominalists and Realists.

Beyond this, both the ancient Greeks and medieval Christians were well aware that one could use words with a conscious and deliberate ambiguism. A well-known definition of allegory (by the early seventh-century encyclopedist and Bishop, Isidore of Seville) was “saying one thing to mean another.” Poets, prophets, sibyls, and mystics employed language in this way as a matter of vocation; and of course, being the Author of Scripture, God was the Arch-Allegorist. (In using words that say one thing while meaning another, the current generation of speakers and writers may also be called allegorists, except that they are usually unconscious of their duplicity.)

Then there is the use of words to mean precisely their opposite:  for instance, when Chaucer calls his Pardoner “a noble preacher” or the Wife of Bath a “good wife”, or when Moliere’s Alceste heaps praise on the poetic doggerel of a hopeless hack. The rhetoricians have called this trope by many names, including “irony” and “sarcasm”, and it remains to this day a useful route of escape from difficult social situations.

In their essays, today’s undergraduates not only regularly choose the wrong words, but, in their casual and arbitrary selection of them–on the assumption that any word can be imperially commanded to mean whatever they have in mind–, they very often hit upon exactly the wrong word: i.e., the word that means the diametrical opposite of what they intend. The first number on Today’s List illustrates this uncanny facility:

 

     Enervate, enervated, enervating, as in, “Mayor Ford’s brilliant performance in the debates seems to have enervated his campaign.” Au contraire, “to enervate” means “to lessen the vitality or vigour of”, “to unnerve”. The contemporary abusers of “enervate” seem to think it means “energize”, an error worthy of Mrs. Malaprop or Gilda Radner’s Emily Litella character. (Never mind.)

     Aggravate, aggravated, aggravating, aggravation, as in, “You’re aggravating me”, or “I don’t need the aggravation.” Knowing a little French, or even less Latin, would go a long way toward the understanding and proper usage of this shopworn word. The French grave means “serious”, the Latin gravis, “heavy, burdensome, grievous, or important”. (Hence our adjective “grave”, and our noun “grave”—residing in which is the gravest human situation of all). The Latin verb aggravare, aggravatus means “to make heavier”. Thus in English, “to aggravate” is “to make worse, more serious, more severe”. One cannot therefore “aggravate” a person (though one can aggravate his mood—his annoyance or irritation).

     They, as in, “Honey, someone from the office left a message, but the line was bad; I think they said something about sexual harassment.” “They” is the third-person-plural personal pronoun; it requires, accordingly, a plural antecedent. The caller (singular) cannot have been a “they”. The contemporary use of “they” to mean “someone” or “something”, i.e., a person or entity of unknown identity, is a breach of kindergarten grammar.

     So, as in, “Thank you so much”, or “I am so sorry”, or “That was so delicious”, or (more imaginatively contemporary), “If Britney comes near Hunter, I am so going to scratch that shank’s eyes out.” By itself, “so” confirms a previously mentioned action or idea; it means “this/that”, “in this/that way”, as in “I think so”, or “Do so”. When employed as an adverbial modifier of an adjective, however, it introduces a clause or phrase. Thus, not “I am so sorry”, but “I am so sorry for offending her that I will don a hair shirt and retire to a monastery”, or “His injury was so serious as to have hospitalized him for a month” (cf. Fr. tant…que).  When contemporaries say “so sorry” or “so good”, they mistake our word for an intensifier: what they mean is “I am very sorry…”

     To go, to be, as in, “Then he went, ‘Let’s have another vodka’, and I went, ‘But we’ve had six already’”, or (from one Flynn McGarry, fifteen-year-old prodigy chef, as recorded in The National Post), “People are always, like, ‘You shouldn’t mark what you want by someone else’s standards’—like three Michelin stars or four New York Times stars—but it’s kind of like a goal to look up to…” When I grew up, “to go” meant (kind of like) “to move, leave, depart”; “to be” (kind of like) “to exist”. Neither meant “to say”.

–What do you read, my lord?

        –Words, words, words.

 

It is now widely acknowledged–by others than merely radical reactionaries such as myself—that the state of English usage has reached an all-time low. If English were a person, he would be sipping his dinner through a straw in the palliative care unit of the state hospital.

The current generation’s inability to speak or write is usually ascribed to its addiction to technology; but the abbreviations and neologisms of techno-babble are merely the late-born symptoms of a disease whose gestation and aetiology hearken back to a time well before the advent of personal computers and video games. Its incubation began in the Sixties, with the pedagogical and ideological assault on grammar, syntax, spelling, usage, and diction prosecuted by savants who regarded these conventions as fascistic impositions on the autonomy and spontaneous creativity of youth. Little Johnny is a flower, it was said; do not step on him, and do not fence him in. Since then, we have reaped a weedy harvest of creativity; my undergraduates are so creative that they are severally the inventors of their own proprietary systems of syntax and orthography, and use words with less relation to any standard dictionary meaning than to their own subjective and varying moods.

Until now, words have tended to acquire fixed meanings through a tacit consensus arrived at freely over the centuries by the users of a language for their mutual benefit: i.e., so that interlocutors might understand one another. But unitary and universally agreed-upon meanings are now as passé as heterosexual marriage. “Alternative lifestyles” and alternative definitions of words go together like a horse and carriage.

In spite of the flexibility of their diction, however, it is interesting that today’s linguistic free spirits have an alarmingly meager vocabulary, and seem to depend, en masse and by default, upon a very small number of locutions. Every generation has its clichés, of course, but clichés become shopworn and ubiquitous only because they express some universally comprehensible idea or truth.   (I.e., they communicate more or less fixed universally accepted meanings.) Today’s reflexive usages are probably too faddish to ever achieve the venerable dignity of clichés, and in any case, are too creative to signify.

 

Beginning with this post, and sporadically in the future, I will exorcise my indignation against some of the more irritating barbarisms in current parlance. I know there is nothing original in what follows; but then, originality (as per the above) is one of the plagues of contemporary culture.

Today’s list:

     Quote, as in “I love this quote…It goes something like this…”. No, what you love (and remember vaguely) is a passage, a verse, a sentence, a phrase, a maxim, a proverb, an aphorism, a dictum, a logion. Such loci, if memorable, might be collected in a book of quotations. Or, hearing someone recite “To be or not to be…”, one might observe cleverly that “That is a quotation from Hamlet.” A “quote” is an estimate, or bid on a job.

     Issue, as in “Fred can’t make lunch; he has an issue at home.” Now, if Fred is having an issue at home, he ought to forget about lunch entirely and go straight to the hospital to have it staunched. An “issue” is an effluence of liquid (cf. “the woman with an issue of blood”). Or it can mean a subject or topic of policy, discussion, debate, or controversy. What Fred has is a “problem”.

     Speak to, as in “The President will speak to the issue of health care during his press conference tomorrow.” No, one cannot speak to an impersonal noun; the President might “speak to” the members of the press; he might “speak about” health care; but but he can’t speak to it. What our speaker meant was that the President will “address” or “discuss” health care tomorrow.

     Fulsome, as in “President Obama offered a fulsome apology for misleading the American people when he promised that they could keep their health care.” Well, if the speaker meant that Obama’s apology was “offensive because of insincerity”, “fulsome” is the mot juste. But I take my quotation (see above) from the Associated Press, a regular apologist for Obama and his apologies. What the AP writer intended to convey was that the President’s apology was “total”, “without reservation” (cf. “full”). Out of the mouths of babes…

     Very unique, as in “Her golf swing is very unique.” Unique, maybe; but not very unique. Something that is “unique” (from unus, “one”) is the only one of its kind in the whole wide world. You can’t get more unique than that.   “Unique”, like other superlatives, is an absolute that does not admit of degrees, and therefore cannot be modified by an intensifier such as “very”.

     Perfect, as in you walk into a restaurant with your spouse, and your hostess inquires, “Where would you guys like to sit.” Your wife has by now gotten used to being addressed in masculine casual, and she indicates the table in the corner. To which your hostess replies approvingly, “Perfect”. An eternity later, your server arrives to take your order. “Have you guys decided.” (Yes, you’ve had enough time to decide on every leg of your upcoming European vacation.)  “I’ll have the rabbit”, says your wife. “Perfect”. “And I’ll have the octopus”, say you.  Also “Perfect”.   “And bring us a bottle of your cheapest house plonk.”  “Perfect”.

Freddy Couples’ golf swing is perfect; Handel’s Amen chorus is perfect; God is perfect. Our word is the capstone of an escalating hyperbole in which “good” or “fine” became “excellent”, then “amazing”, then “awesome”. Now everything is “perfect”. Next year, look out for “very perfect”; the year after, “totally perfect”.

The myth of progress, to which modern liberals glibly subscribe, imagines that the present is ineluctably better—more enlightened, more compassionate, more egalitarian, more just–than the past; and that the future will be ineluctably better than the present. Progressives are always intoning the mantras of “change”, “hope”, and the “future”. While they deride any such superstitious fantasies as Paul’s “faith in things unseen”, that is precisely what their faith in the future amounts to. And though they are reflexively skeptical about the past, only the past, ontologically speaking, possesses substantial reality. The future has none. (Even the present, which they also extol–as in the injunction to “live in the moment”–has no empirical status. The present is an infinitesimally narrow line of division between past and future: a mere mathematical concept.)

It’s easy to demand change when the collateral offered is the gauzy promise of a “better future”. (Try that with your bank manager.) But progressives never tell us precisely what that future will look like. The question they must be made to answer, as Joseph Sobran has insisted, is in what kind of society they would be conservatives.

Liberals assume that traditional social arrangements, religious institutions, and moral and philosophical ideas are atavisms preserved only by a cravenly uncritical acceptance of authority, or a blind intellectual conformity. Their antinomianism is worn as the badge of a fearless and heroic independence of mind. Yet practically every major progressive initiative has been the product of mass sentiment, and thereafter celebrated as the triumph of the collective “will of the people”.   Once victorious, the progressive herd of independent minds has betrayed a depressingly ruthless habit of eliminating dissent: from the Gulag, to the speech codes of the modern Academy, to the heresy trials of global warming “deniers” or the defendants arraigned before our human rights tribunals. Today, major sectors of society—the educational establishment; journalism; the television, film, and music industries; the arts and literary community; the public unions and functionaries of the Welfare State—are hothouses of progressive ideological purity, hermetically sealed against contamination by even a spore of non-conforming opinion.

If traditions survive, on the contrary, it’s usually because, as the end-product of centuries of social and moral experimentation and amelioration, they have been proven to work. In this regard, conservatives are the real skeptics; they demand empirical evidence of the efficacy of “alternative lifestyles” before they are prepared to make the leap into the beyond.

In their attitude toward the past, conservatives thus also show a far deeper respect for the mores and opinions of “ordinary people” than those who are constantly lecturing them on their supposed “elitism”. It was Chesterton who famously defined tradition as “the democracy of the dead”. He might have taken the next step and defined modern liberalism as the tyranny of those who happen at this moment to be alive.

It is a natural human tendency, of course, to perceive one’s own historical period in exquisite focus and detail, and esteem it accordingly, while The Rest of History recedes like the background of an Early Netherlandish painting into the mists of obscurity. Every generation tends to regard its advent as the long-awaited fruition of the world-process. But the perspective of the current generation has become so foreshortened that its members seem to think and live as though the world were created the day they were born. That perspective is the temporal equivalent of the geographical self-centricity of Manhattanites, as it was famously satirized on the cover of an old New Yorker magazine, whose cartoon mappa mundi showed Manhattan, in exquisite focus and detail, occupying most of the frame, the Hudson River on its edge, and beyond that, in a narrow band, New Jersey and The Rest of the World.

The historical Narcissism of those who happen at this moment to be alive has become so overwhelming that our contemporaries can hardly imagine that things could ever have been different, or that humans once believed or behaved other than they do now. After listening to a lecture on the House of Pride in Book I (canto iv) of Spenser’s Faerie Queene, a perplexed young undergraduate approached my desk to inquire, “Do you mean that pride isn’t a good thing?” No, pride is a capital sin, and has been counted as such for at least the previous three millennia of Western Civilization–with the exception, that is, of the past fifty years. But then, having been taught that everyone is “special” (but never having been taught to reason that, ergo, no one is special); having received prizes for losing; having watched videos of the Pride Parade, year after year, in her Sexual Diversity Class; and having graduated magna cum sua laude from Self-Esteem High, one can hardly blame my student for thinking of pride as an immemorial virtue.

 

Readers of these pages will be familiar with the traditional Western credendum that wisdom, happiness, and self-realization depend upon a man’s living a life of reason in control of his passions, rejecting the spurious goods and pleasures of the senses and the world, while contemplating the higher intelligible realities sometimes designated by the felicitous Pauline phrase invisibilia Dei. These moral presuppositions remained unchanged from the birth of Greek philosophy in the sixth-century B.C. down, at least, to the beginning of the Romantic Period. In the relatively brief time since then, their opposites have become settled norms, accepted without question in spite of their callow novelty. Today, we are all disciples of the Playboy School of Philosophy, in spite of the social and psychological carnage it has wrought. And with what seems to me a breathless lack of intellectual humility, the moral attitudes that prevailed universally in the West for centuries are dismissed as unnatural, morbid, or impossible. No one (as I am assured repeatedly by my students and acquaintances) could have actually lived in indifference to, or denial of, the flesh and the world.

I am consoled to have come across a passage from the great early twentieth century classicist, Gilbert Murray, which muscularly refutes such modernist prejudices. About Platonism and Stoicism (the two principal schools of thought from Hellenistic times right down to the dawn of modernity), Murray asserts that

…amid their differences there is one faith which was held by both in common. It is the great characteristic faith of the ancient world, revealing itself in many divergent guises and seldom fully intelligible to modern men; faith in the absolute supremacy of the inward life over things external. These men really believed that wisdom is more precious than jewels, that poverty and ill health are things of no import, that the good man is happy whatever befall him, and all the rest. And in generation after generation many of the ablest men, and women also, acted upon the belief. They lived by free choice lives whose simplicity and privation would horrify a modern labourer, and the world about hem seems to have respected rather than despised their poverty. To the Middle Age, with its monks and mendicants expectant of reward in heaven, such an attitude, except for its disinterestedness, would be easily understood. To some eastern nations, with their cults of asceticism and contemplation, the same doctrines have appealed almost like a physical passion or a dangerous drug running riot in their veins. But modern western man cannot believe them, nor believe seriously that others believe them. On us the power of the material world has, through our very mastery of it and the dependence which results from that mastery, both inwardly and outwardly increased its hold. Capta ferum victorem cepit. We have taken possession of it, and now we cannot move without it.

In our pyrrhic victory over the material world, as Murray observes, we have been taken captive by it. The image of our captivity to and in the corporeal order, so edifyingly expressive of our modern predicament, is itself, one should note, a venerable Platonist topos.

The Shepherd’s Park and the Garden of Deduit…

Their Biblical Archetypes:  the True Paradise and the Post-lapsarian Eden…

The Roman as an Allegory of the Fall…

     Near the end of the Roman, Jean de Meun devotes several hundred lines to the description of a second garden.  Within its verdant borders, the flowers are as bright and virginal as springtime; but they keep their youthful colours forever, and their beauty never fades.  Indeed, one can pluck their buds morning and night, and in every season of the year.  Here the Good Shepherd keeps his flock:  “no mighty throng”, but only a “few”.

At  lines 20279f., the poet begins to make explicit the narrative and moral significance of this episode (though the alert reader requires no authorial guidance).  Whoever, he says, would compare the beauty of that garden, in which the lover saw Sir Delight and his capering minions, to the beauty of this garden, is a fool.  There is no lack of abundance of beautiful flowers, birds, and streams in the Garden of Delight, to be sure; but “These things are fables, vain imaginings; no stable facts but fictions that will fade.”  Like the rose, the dreamer’s Garden of Delights is another figment of his overcharged imagination.  In the Shepherd’s Park, by contrast, the joys and pleasures are real and everlasting.

 

At its centre, beside an ever-verdant olive tree which “bears salvation’s fruit”, stands a fountain, from whose waters those sheep who are permitted to drink will gain innumerable blessings.  Once they have imbibed,

                   no more thirst they have,
But live together as they will, nor feel
The blight of illness or the sting of death.
In lucky hour they pass within these gates;
In lucky hour they see the Lamb of God,
Whom they may follow in the narrow path,
While the Good Shepherd guards, whose only wish
Is to purvey them harborage with Him.
None who once drink from that pure stream can die.

Then, the contrast, once again, is solemnly drawn:

          this is not the fountain ‘neath the tree
The Lover saw enclosed in marble verge.
He should be ridiculed who praised that spring—
The bitter, poisonous Fountain Perilous
That killed the fair Narcissus, who therein
Admired himself until he pined away.
The Lover himself was not ashamed, indeed,
To recognize and testimony give
About that fountain’s character, nor hide
Its cruelty, when he applied the name
Of Mirror Perilous to it, and said
That when he looked therein he felt a throb
Of painful grief, and heaved a heavy sigh.
You see what sweetness in the spring he found!
Fine fountain this, that makes well people ill!

When he first surveyed the Garden of Sir Pleasure through the two crystals in that fountain of self-love, the dreamer saw only illusions and fantasies.  But in the fountain in the Shepherd’s Park,

Always, from whatsoever side [one] looks,
[He] sees all things contained within the park
And recognizes each for what it is,
And ever knows its worth.  He who has seen
Himself reflected there at once becomes
So wise a master that he nevermore
Can be deceived by aught that may occur.

The section then concludes with the poet’s question to his readers:

What think you of this park that I’ve described
And of the Lover’s garden?  Tell me, lords.
On accident and substance give your votes
And reasonable verdict.  By your faith
Declare which seems to you more beautiful.
Consider the two fountains, and decide
Which furnishes the more health-giving stream
And water the more pure and virtuous.
Judging the nature of the conduits,
Say which is more praiseworthy.  Judge the pine
And olive which o’ershade the living streams;…
That sooner an agreement you may reach
I’ll briefly summarize what I have said
About the fountains’ virtues and true worth:
The one intoxicates a living man
And brings him to his death; whereas, in truth,
The dead are by the other spring revived.

The moral force of Jean de Meun’s antinomies depends, of course, upon their biblical referents, which no medieval reader could fail to recognize beneath the surface of the allegory.  Deduit’s garden is a garden of earthly delights, a parody of the Edenic Paradise, or rather, an image of Eden corrupted by the Fall.  The Shepherd’s Park is the True Eden, the heavenly Paradise regenerated from the dead and sin-laden desert of human history by Christ’s Sacrifice.  The dreamer’s false paradise of carnal and sensible delights is inhabited by a throng of revelers; the Shepherd’s Park is home to the elect few, the virtuous and wise who can distinguish reality from appearance and find their happiness in the pursuit of the eternal and invisible things of God.  Related to this is the image of the “narrow” path and gate that lead to the Shepherd’s Park, a commonplace allusion to the famous verses (7:13-14) from Matthew:

Enter ye in at the strait gate:  for wide is the gate and broad is the way, the leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat:

Because strait is the gate and narrow is the way, which leadeth into life, and few there be that find it.

The pine in Deduit’s garden is, plainly enough, a type of the Tree of Knowledge; conversely in the Shepherd’s Park, the olive that “bears salvation’s fruit” recalls the Tree of Life, whose pendant fruit is Christ crucified upon that Tree in the form of the Cross.  The two fountains, similarly, have their antitypes in the Fountains of Death and Life that traditionally belong to the iconography of the biblical Eden.

The Roman de la Rose is thus, like so many other medieval narratives, a grand allegory of the Fall, whose three-stage process, as re-actualized in every subsequent act of sin (and especially the passio of lust), we have already discussed at length.  Such underlying image-complexes and ideas, with which every medieval reader was familiar, aggrandize an otherwise trivial, if not puerile theme, into a universal human and literary context.  Though I trust that the Roman’s moral irony and satirical humour are readily appreciated on their own, a modern reader’s enjoyment and understanding of such texts can only be enriched by his awareness of these allegorical traditions.