The Platonic Afflatus of Christianity…

Clement of Alexandria and the Phaedo

Platonic Paradoxes:  Night and Day; Sleeping and Waking; Dream and “Reality”…

The Way of the Cross and the Way of the Philosopher…

     It is impossible to overestimate the importance of these ideas for later Western thought.  The whole Christian ethos of contemptus mundiof mortifying the body and anesthetizing the physical senses, of dying to the world and the flesh with Christ on the Cross and in baptism–is profoundly indebted to them, insofar as the early Fathers expressly read the teaching of Plato in general and the Phaedo in particular into the Christian narrative and doctrine.

Since the Platonic afflatus of Christianity is so little understood by contemporary Christians, not excluding the Church’s hierarchs, I cannot resist giving you just a few examples.  For the sake of economy I limit myself here to the early Christian Apologist and Father of the Church, Clement of Alexandria, writing at the end of the second century A.D. (though all of the Christian theologians from the second to the fourth centuries are similarly indebted to the Platonic Muse).

In his great summa, The Stromata, Clement writes:

…The Saviour Himself enjoins, “Watch therefore, for ye know not what hour your Lord doth come” [Matt. 24: 42]; as much as to say, “Study how to live, and endeavour to separate the soul from the body.”  (V, xiv).

The quotation is, of course, from Phaedo 67 e, where the goal of the rational life is defined in terms of the soul’s emancipation from the body at death, of which the philosopher’s vocation is a protracted rehearsal.

The whole Platonic gospel of the deliverance of the embodied soul from the earthly cave of shadows and illusions into the ethereal daylight to which it belongs is thus placed by Clement in the mouth of Christ, and identified as the “True Philosophy”:

Now the sacrifice which is acceptable to God is the unswerving abstraction of the mind from the body and its passions [Phaed. 64 c-65 d].  This is the really true piety.  And is not, on this account, philosophy rightly called by Socrates the practice of death? [Phaed. 64 a; 67 e]  For he who neither employs his eyes in the exercise of thought, nor draws anything from his other senses, but with the purified mind alone apprehends reality [Phaed. 65 e-66 a, 82 d-84 b], practises the True Philosophy.  (Strom. V, xi)

The promise of Greek philosophy is thus fulfilled by the “True Philosopher” Christ and His “Gnostic” followers.  Echoing the Phaedo once again, Clement writes:

Just as death is the separation of the soul from the body, so is Gnosis as it were the rational death urging the spirit away, separating it from the passions,…so that it may say with confidence to God, “I live as Thou wishest.”  (Strom. VII, xii)

But Christ’s “True Philosophy” continues nevertheless to be expressed by Clement in terms of the well-known paradoxes of Platonism.  We have just noted one of them, in the inverse relationship between outer sight and hearing and the inner senses.  We have already encountered another in Cicero’s Somnium, in which life on earth is called by Scipio “death”, whereas the death that liberates the soul from its carnal prison ushers in the true life of the spirit in heaven.  According to another, related paradox, our waking consciousness is really a dream of unreality, and it is only in sleep and dream, when our physical senses are anaesthetized, that our inner spiritual senses are awakened and, with them, we perceive reality.

The most famous locus of this complex of ideas is in Socrates’ exposition of the allegory of the caveRepublic, to whose teaching Clement refers approvingly in the Stromata: 

Plato, again, in the seventh book of the Republic, has called “the day here nocturnal”, as I suppose, on account of “the world-rulers of this darkness” [Eph. 6:12], and the descent of the soul into the body, sleep and death, similarly with Heraclitus…(Strom. V, xiv)

But if the “day here” is, by comparison to the “true day”, a dream of unreality, yet, as Clement writes in his Paedagogus,

Turning in on ourselves [Phaed. 65 c], illumining the eyes of the hidden man, and gazing on truth itself,…we may clearly and intelligibly reveal such dreams as are true. (Paed. II, ix)

The distinction between the false dream that haunts the shadow-world of the embodied soul and the true dreams revealed to the inward-turning intelligence was a commonplace of the pagan Middle Platonism of Clement’s time.  The late-second-century Middle Platonist Maximus of Tyre provides a contemporary statement of the theme:

Our life in this realm is simply and truly a dream; the soul, buried in the body and overwhelmed by stupor and repletion, perceives reality with the dim approximation of one dreaming…but should there be a pure and sober soul, little fuddled by the stupor and repletion of this world, then it is surely reasonable to suppose that the dreams which it encounters…are clear and distinct and close to the truth.

…the freedom of the good man’s soul from the pleasures and sufferings of the body, when by escaping from the tumult of the physical world and turning its intelligence in on itself [Phaed. 65 c], [allows it to] re-encounter pure Truth, free from imperfect images.  This does indeed resemble a beautiful slumber, full of vivid dreams…[Then] Reason…reawakens the understanding [of the soul], which is dim and constrained and torpid. (Orations, passim)

The complementary relationship between the inner and outer faculties suggested by this passage was another ubiquitous Middle Platonic theme.  As the birth of the soul in the body is the sleep of mind, so, in the imagery of Plato and his followers, by turning away from the bodily senses the mind lulls them into somnolence, and reawakens its own inner, spiritual sensorium:  “You must put the life of the senses to sleep”, enjoins the pagan Middle Platonist Celsus (c. 160 A.D.), “and lift up your minds, turn away from the flesh and open the eyes of your souls [Rep. 533 d].  By those means alone will you be able to see God.” (The True Doctrine)

Clement expresses a variant of the same idea as follows:

The need of sleep is not in the soul…But while the body is relieved by sleep, the soul meanwhile not acting through the body is able to exercise intelligence within itself,…undistracted [Phaed. 66 a] by the affections of the body, and counseling with itself in the best manner…From the practice of wakefulness, it grasps eternity. (Paed. II, ix)

As the reader is invited to infer, then, it is the wakefulness of the Platonic inner man, unclouded by the physical senses, that Clement understands by the vigilance enjoined by Christ in Matt. 24: 42 (Strom. V, xiv, above).  The wakefulness of the intelligence, that is, entails the “sleep” of the physical senses, which is like the “death” of the body, insofar as it releases the mind from the body’s soporific influence, and allows the soul to live again as it was originally intended to, “alone” and unencumbered:

And for this reason…they have called night Euphrone [cheerful, genial]; since then the soul, released from the perceptions of sense, turns in on itself (Phaed. 65 c), and has a truer hold on wisdom.  Wherefore the mysteries are for the most part celebrated at night, indicating the withdrawal of the soul from the body, which takes place [in sleep] at night…And as to what, again, they say of sleep, the very same things are to be understood of death.  For each exhibits the departure of the soul…; as we may also understand this in Heraclitus:  “Man touches truth in himself, when dead and his light quenched; and alive, when he sleeps he touches the truth of the dead; and awake, when he shuts his eyes.” (Strom., IV, xxii)

Other allusions to the Phaedo reveal the same perfunctory Christianizations of these conventional Platonic themes.  Clement records Plato’s warning that “each pleasure and pain nails the soul to the tomb of the body” (Phaed. 83 d). This suggests the New Testament imagery of the Cross, which Clement explicitly discovers in the Platonic exhortation (a calculated paraphrase) to “crucify the passions”.

In Clement’s mind, the way of the Cross and the way of the philosopher are one:

  For if you would loose, and withdraw, and separate yourself [Phaed. 64 c, e, 65 c-d]–for this is what the Cross means–from your life in this world, you will possess it.  And this would be the practice of death [Phaed. 67 e]. (Strom. II, xx)

Thus, the Christian who mortifies the flesh with Christ on the Cross, losing his life in order to save his soul, pursues the identical vocation as the Platonic sage who “rehearses death” as prescribed in thePhaedo, by turning away from the distractions of the body, the senses, and the world and withdrawing into the psychic depths, where the mind may live in tranquil solitude.

Throughout The Stromata, the Pauline ideal of deadness to this world is in this way equated by Clement with the Platonic philosopher’s curriculum of death:

The severance, therefore, of the soul from the body, made a life-long study, produces in the philosopher Gnostic alacrity, so the he is easily able to bear natural death, which is the dissolution of the chains which bind the soul to the body.  “For the world is crucified to me, and I to the world”, the apostle says [Gal. 6: 14]. (Strom. IV, iii)

…And the Realities of Life on Earth…

 

Some cultural phenomena are self-satirizing.  Consider the interminable seventies-era movie series Airport starring George Kennedy, which hardly required its later take-off (pun intended) Airplane with Leslie “Don’t call me Shirley” Nielson to demonstrate its formulaic stupidity.  (However unintentionally, the scene in the original in which a folk-singing celebrity performs to the delight of a plucky pubescent girl en route to a liver transplant is much funnier than any conceivable parody, even one that involves a guitar-strumming nun.)

Along with Airport, the Arab Street celebrating by firing Kalashnikovs into the air, and a few other manifestations of the brute insanity of the contemporary world, surely (Shirley) the Occupy Wall Street Movement falls into the same self-satirizing category.

Now that their discarded Slurpee cups, spent needles, and soiled condoms have been gathered up by volunteers, and new sod laid in the Woodstockian mud that the Occupiers left behind, it is time to pause in wonder that anyone could have taken them or their risible message seriously.

The 99%?  Shirley not.  I defer to no one in my abysmal estimate of the state of human civilization; but not even I am such a bilious misanthrope as to imagine that the vast majority of mankind bears any similarity to the whining, drug-addled moral bullies who, being off their medication for too long, have recently trampled, pissed, and defecated upon the fall flowers in some of the world’s most beautiful parks.  (Try to imagine the outcry from these same vaunted defenders of Gaia if a corporation had so polluted public lands.)

In the Middle Ages, the sin of hypocrisy was typically personified by a literary character known as Faux Semblant, usually a friar who, having taken a solemn vow of poverty and humility, disports himself like a cross between Croesus and Dominique Strauss-Khan.   Today, I can think of no more apt representative of that persistent vice than the anti-capitalist protestor.

Never before has the world been so credulous of rank hypocrisy.   The progressive thinker need do nothing more these days than promote some pious statist fantasy (income equality; wind turbines; solar power; ethanol) and the beau monde’s critical faculties are instantly benumbed.  Say the magic word “green”, “clean”,  or “earth” in conjunction with any cockamamie scheme and—open sesame—the gates to government tax breaks and subsidies are instantly unbarred to the shiftiest of venture capitalists.  When it serves them as a cudgel with which to beat capitalism, progressives are constantly complaining about corporate welfare; but they grow reverently silent when the recipient is Big Green.  Save the planet?  I would have been happy if the Occupiers had merely deigned to stoop and scoop their own excreta.

 

The anathematization by righteous socialists of the sins of capitalist culture (greed, selfishness, materialism, and so on) might be more credible were they not themselves so spectacularly guilty of them.  The annual socialist protest tour is invariably attended by middle class youths shod in Nikes and carrying Blackberries or iPhones–the very icons of conspicuous consumption, not to mention products that could only have been brought to market by vast multinational corporations raising capital through the international banking system and sourcing parts and labour in the global marketplace.  At the recent anti-G-20 demonstration in Toronto, the storm-troopers of social justice smashed the windows of Mom and Pop stores and altruistically looted their hard-won livelihood, iPhones and big screen TVs being their preferred booty.  In the nineteen-thirties, when real poverty still existed, rioters smashed the windows of bakeries and stole bread.  But no one hears of the soi-disant poor breaking into bakeries these days.

Though the bedrock of justice and democracy is equality before the law, the Occupiers had no permits for their demonstrations and continued to squat in public spaces even after the courts issued injunctions for their removal.  Every other group in the world is bound to apply for and be granted permission to demonstrate on public property, and none would ever have been allowed to forcibly take over common land for their unlimited private enjoyment (the real, unsentimental meaning of the “occupation”); but the Occupiers evidently assumed that they were somewhat more equal than others.  So much for their egalitarian scorn for the privileged 1%.

President Obama said their cause was just, and vociferously supported them.  But then President Obama’s own populist “soak the rich” re-election campaign can only profit–is it ontologically possible for socialists to profit?–from widespread demonstrations against capitalism.  I wonder whether he will ever publically take responsibility for the inevitable violence and property damage that his words have incited.

 

Outside the hive of leftist politicians, academics, and journalists (still, thankfully, considerably less than 1% of the population), the only other supporters of the Occupiers were the public sector union grandees who provided logistics:   specifically, port-o-potties (which, alas, the Occupiers did not always use) and meals (which the Occupiers instructively refused to share with the indigenous homeless—the original Occupiers–occasionally leading to violent confrontations between the “poor” and their supposed advocates.)

Leaders of the public sector unions are regulars on the anti-capitalist protest tour where, from the safety of the sidelines, they egg on to anarchic violence the more excitable youth.  It is quaint to hear them decry the privileges of the wealthy as they disport themselves on their ideological junkets, paid for by the compulsory dues extracted from the union rank and file whether they agree with official union class-warfare demagoguery or not.  In the past, union delegations were dispatched to such grim laboratories of socialism as Bulgaria and Romania; today, they are feted at five-star hotels in Brussels, London, or New York.

The union presence on the protest rota is supposed to dramatize the great Gnostic struggle between the capitalist World-Governors (i.e., the Wall Street Bankers and corporate CEOs) and the ORDINARY WORKING MAN.   Save that if he is lucky enough to be employed in the public sector, the “ordinary working man” enjoys a salary, benefits package, pension, job security, and annual raises that no private sector employee would dare to confabulate in his wildest dreams.  These, moreover, are paid directly by the taxpayer (the real 99%), as will be the tumescent debt with which public sector selfishness and greed have burdened present and future generations in perpetuity.  The State functionary’s lifestyle of parasitical privilege, as demonstrated recently in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, is responsible for the evaporation of more trillions of dollars of wealth in international stock markets (in which everyone is now invested) than the original Great Recession of 2008.  And while the “obscene compensation” conferred upon corporate CEOs is a matter of direct concern only to the company’s board of directors and shareholders (who remain at liberty to rein them in or invest elsewhere), that freedom is never enjoyed by the taxpayer, whose only choices are to fund State profligacy or face incarceration.  No matter what frontier you fix beyond which you calculate that remuneration has become “obscene”, you will find that in absolute terms there is exponentially more fraud, waste, and over-compensation (i.e., obscenity) in the grasping, porcine apparatus of any single Western Welfare State than in the combined salaries of all the corporate CEOs on the planet.

Sooner or later, if any social or moral progress is to be achieved by humankind, the Axis of Progress is going to have to metabolize the rudimentary fact that the State and all who are dependent upon the State live at the expense of, and by the good graces, of private citizens active in the capitalist economy.   It is only by confiscating and redistributing the “obscene profits” of capitalist entrepreneurs—those who actually seed and create wealth in the first place (including Wall Street and the corporations)–that the government and its unionized functionaries enjoy their relative affluence.   The generous pensions of unionized workers, moreover, would be insolvent if they weren’t managed by shifty Wall Street bankers and invested in rapacious corporations listed on the world’s stock exchanges.  The profits of those diabolical capitalist entities keep union pensions afloat and growing.   Only when union caudillos put their money—literally—where their mouths are, demanding divestiture from the global market (and thus willingly beggaring themselves), should anyone begin to take their stale Marxist rodomontade seriously.

 

Appealing as it does to the most deadly of the deadly sins (envy, ire, idleness, pride, and especially avarice), the Marxist myth has apparently proven unkillable.  In the popular imagination, the recession of 2008 continues to be imputed to the malfeasance and greed of Wall Street bankers, even though the root cause—to use a beloved progressive phrase–of the crisis was another grand government social program:  the wildly irresponsible extension of mortgages, by both state agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and private banks, all under governmental directive and with governmental guarantees, to those without the means to repay them, in fulfillment of the egalitarian fantasy that every American should be able to own his own home.    When the bubble burst and the world economy crashed, those who had engineered this calamity, not wanting to waste a good crisis, took the opportunity to blame it on the inherent defectiveness of capitalism.   The capitalist system, they intoned gravely, was nigh its end.  The whirlwind sown by years of unregulated Reagan-era greed was about be reaped!  A year or so later, the European sovereign debt crisis plunged the global economy back into an even deeper and evidently more intransigent recession.  But no one inculpated the recklessness, or animadverted on the inherent defectiveness, of the European Welfare State.  No one proclaimed the final and merciful demise of democratic socialism.  I for one was grateful that the Axis of Progress did not find a way to blame the European debt crisis too on capitalism.

There is nothing new or surprising about the protracted and ongoing European debacle, the predictable result of generations of populist politicians and community activists claiming credit for altruism and compassion by selflessly giving away other people’s money to buy the votes and pander to the idleness and avarice of their dependent constituencies, while gratifying their own lust for wealth and power.  It would have been too much to hope that the Occupiers or their supporters would be anything but silent on their drunken orgy of spending, notwithstanding that Big Government had once again fattened itself to bursting, while impoverishing everyone else, including the poorest of the poor in developing countries, across the globe.   Instead, the Occupiers went about their business as if the default of Europe never happened, and reflexively revived the perennial mantras of the anti-capitalist campaign:   THE RICH DON’T PAY THEIR FAIR SHARE OF TAXES; THE RICH ARE GETTING RICHER; THE POOR ARE GETTING POORER; THE GAP BETWEEN THEM IS WIDENING; THE MIDDLE CLASS IS DISAPPEARING.

Over the decades, such prefabricated dooms have been pronounced by anti-capitalist eschatologists indifferently through bad times and good, bear markets and bull, and no matter how Chicken-Littleish they must sound by now to anyone over the age of twenty, the megaphones of the liberal media never fail to echo them with apocalyptic urgency.   By such glib repetition, the sort of Big Lies that ought to have been buried forevermore at the bottom of the historical rubbish heap, beneath the ruins of the Berlin Wall, periodically rise again in the West and walk the earth like the undead, reminding us that socialism is not an economic theory so much as an ineradicable superstition.

In the U.S. in 2009 (the most recent year for which data are available), the top 1% of earners paid 37% of all federal income taxes; the top 10% paid 70%, the top 25%, 87%; and the top 50%, 98%.  The bottom 49% paid nothing.  The figures going back to 1999 show a very nearly identical pattern of dispersion from year to year.  (One interesting footnote is that the income threshold for the top 1% in 2009 was $343,000, down substantially from $410,000 in 2007, whereas the bottom 50% remained steady.  So much for the bromide that the rich are always getting richer, immune as they supposedly are to economic downturns, and the poor poorer.)

The rich don’t pay their fair share?  One should be grateful, I suppose, when at least a parody of the truth percolates up from the fever swamps of leftist agit-prop.  But by any objective standard, it is the rich, not the poor, who are the victims of gross unfairness.  As the data show, the modern Ship of State is propelled by a small cohort of earners chained to the oars below, while a majority lounge on deck enjoying the fresh sea breezes.   The rich are in fact an exploited minority of helot-workers who produce the wealth that sustains a leviathanic Welfare State and its dependent citizenry.   When the labour of a quarter of the population is expropriated for the sustenance of the rest you have economic enslavement on an ancient Spartan scale.  A version of the Marxist clarion-call is for once apposite:  Wealthy of the world, unite.  You have nothing to lose but your chains.

To argue that the rich don’t pay their fair share requires a Protean re-definition of the concept of fairness, to say the least.  But then the Axis of Progress has always been admirably adept at finding novel significations for universally agreed-upon terms (cf., most recently, homosexual “marriage”).  As it applies to taxation, the old-fashioned dictionary meaning of fairness demands one of only two possible alternatives.  Either every citizen pays an equal portion of total taxes (i.e., a fraction of 1 over the number that represents the total taxpaying population).  Or every citizen pays for no more and no less than what he personally consumes in government disbursements and services.  Under both definitions, the rich are spectacularly ill-used, even if one were to eliminate progressivity and adopt a flat tax instead.  (Unless traditional arithmetic has been superseded in the same way as traditional moral nomenclature, 20% of, say, a million dollars is still exponentially more than 20% of $50,000).  Compounding the injustice is the fact that high earners consume an infinitesimal fraction of the government benefits bestowed upon the middle class or the poor (i.e., the rich don’t rely on food stamps, rent subsidies, Medicaid, welfare, unemployment “insurance”, and the vast array of anti-poverty programs; they tend not to apply, or qualify for, tuition bursaries, job counseling, grants for unread magazines, homosexual theatre groups, blasphemous art installations, etc., etc.)

 

Don’t misunderstand me.  I don’t feel the least bit sorry for the wealthy.  All in all, they strike me as a morbidly pusillanimous lot, either too spineless to object to being fleeced, or too willing to be suborned (for their own selfish reasons, of course) by the anti-capitalist mob.  As the R.H. Macy character explains in the Christmas classic Miracle on Thirty-Fourth Street, while endorsing his new store Santa’s altruistic policy of sending customers to other stores when Macy’s doesn’t have what they want:   “From now on, we’ll be known as the caring company, the company with a heart, the company that puts people before profits.  And consequently we’ll make more profit than ever before.”

Along with Bill Gates, George Soros, and others, Warren Buffett has recently stepped forth as the spokesman for a cell of super-rich penitents who, burdened by capitalist remorse, expiate their guilt by publically flagellating others.  In one of the rankest factoids of disinformation to emerge from the propaganda mills of the Left in decades, Buffett has reported (confessed) that he pays the same amount in taxes as his own secretary!  Let us be charitable.  Perhaps he meant—no doubt he “misspoke”– that he is in the same tax bracket as his secretary.  But then, even so, it is only because his high-priced accountants have arranged for him to be remunerated in the form of capital gains rather than salary.   Why has he taken their advice?  Because capital gains are taxed at a lower rate, of course.  For a deliberate tax dodger to then represent himself as a champion of tax fairness and demand that the rich pay “their share” is hypocrisy of Tartuffian proportions.  If Buffett thinks he should be paying more in taxes, he is entirely free at any time to hand over all or any portion of his income to the IRS, without hectoring others on their moral responsibilities.

Increasing taxes on the rich is Buffett’s and the Occupiers’ solution to the supposed problem of the increasing disparity between the rich and the poor.  Not that this has ever worked in the past.  Even the rich put limits on their guilty servitude, and while they are too complacent to rise up, they can always opt out.  Tax their filthy lucre beyond a certain threshold and they will eventually resort to such loopholes as those discovered by Buffett’s accountants, or conclude that it is no longer worth the risk and effort to persevere in greed and malefaction for the privilege of keeping the meager scraps left to them by the State.  They will close up shop, and the tax collector will thereafter walk away empty-handed.   (A dramatic illustration of this rudimentary behavioural principle occurred recently when, seeking to “soak the rich”, populist politicians raised taxes on yachts, thus completely destroying the luxury boatbuilding industry, un-employing its thousands of workers, and depleting government coffers in the process.)    As the evidence has proven redundantly over the decades, the inverse relationship between tax rates and tax revenues is an iron law of economics.  High marginal tax rates result in lower absolute returns; low rates, conversely, yield high tax revenues because they are incentives to the creation of new businesses, and investment in and expansion of existing ones.  If the State really wants to reap more tax revenues, it ought to be a little kinder to the downtrodden sowers in the field:  it ought to be known (to paraphrase Mr. Macy) as the government that puts people before revenues.  And consequently, it will collect more tax revenues than ever before.

 

Of course the rich are getting richer.  But then so too are the poor and the middle class (alive and well).  Of course the gap between the richest and the poorest is widening.  But how could it be otherwise?  If in 1990, let us say, the average menial labourer earned $x, the average corporate CEO $100x, and the economy grew by 3% per annum in the next ten years, wouldn’t the income gap between them have increased to considerably more than $99x by the year 2000?  Such modest growth in GDP as most capitalist economies traditionally enjoy widens gaps as a matter of mathematical necessity (while also enriching everyone in the process).  

One doesn’t expect these banal arithmetical realities to penetrate the consciousness of the Occupiers and their allies, for whom punishing the rich and appropriating more of their ill-gotten gains (greed, anyone?) are moral obsessions.  For the economic illiterate with a smattering of Marxist theory, the economy will always be a zero-sum game, the rich will only get richer at the expense of the poor, and Robin Hood will always be the model of Good Government.  My favourite of the Occupiers’ signs decrying the disparity between rich and poor:  MAKE THE RICH POOR AND THE POOR RICH.   Leaving aside that this will merely eternize the “problem” as the clever sign-bearer misunderstands it, there is once again a parodic inflection of the truth lurking beneath the literal surface of this self-defeating desideratum:  Making the rich poor and the poor rich is the ruthless genius of capitalism; (the converse is that socialism tends to render everyone, outside of the State apparatus, immutably equal in poverty).  In free societies, income disparity is rarely a static (i.e., “class”) phenomenon, and usually a highly fluid and personal one.  It occurs most dramatically within a single earner’s lifetime.  But a few short years ago, today’s super-rich (e.g., Steve Jobs, Bill Gates) were mere peons.  Some of today’s poor will be fabulously wealthy tomorrow.

Lovers of freedom celebrate that sort of disparity, insofar as it corresponds to the natural disparities that occur in the real world—disparities in talent, industry, and dumb luck–as opposed to the unnatural equality that can only be imposed by totalitarian force.  Wisdom, as Western Philosophy used to define it before descending into existential angst, consists in accepting these disparities with resignation or even gratitude, rather than being permanently discomposed by envy or indignant wrath.

For this reason, it is hard for me to understand why adults should be find economic disparity so peculiarly perturbing.  Doesn’t the top percentile in intelligence own a disproportionate quantum of the world’s brains?  No one protests that Tim Robbins and Susan Sarandon have between them accumulated much more than their fair share of the cuteness extant in the world (let alone the power, money, and influence that these unearned natural endowments confer).  The only difference between such “unfair” personal advantages as beauty and intelligence on the one hand and wealth on the other is that the former can’t be forcibly redistributed—else the Soviets would have already done so.  As a bald man, who has lived his life under a serious handicap in the ruthless competition for a mate, I resent the fact that the obscenely hirsute have more hair than they could possibly need.  But then, unfairness and cut-throat competition are not the creations of capitalism; they are the baneful conditions of life on earth.

 

I have to admit, the Occupiers’ choice of metaphor was certainly (if unconsciously) inspired.  In popular usage, the word “occupation” has two primary denotations.  It can mean a job, such as many of the Occupiers have eschewed with the same sense of urgency as P.G. Wodehouse’s Bertie Wooster.  It also signifies an act of military depredation, in which conquerors usurp territory that belongs to others and live on in these stolen domains as colonial slave-masters.  The latter applies directly to the anti-capitalist Occupiers, as I have said, but more importantly inasmuch as the socialist mythology they propagate continues to possess and enslave the Western psyche two decades after it was buried in those Eastern Bloc countries once occupied in the literal sense.

Redemptive Music…

The Merchant of Venice…The Phaedo…

Inner and Outer Hearing and Sight…

       Demonstrating again the durability of such ideas and their ability to transcend the divisions of time and religious culture, the notion that music can be redemptive, inasmuch as it echoes the heavenly music of the spheres,  is rehearsed in another classic expression of the topos in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice:

Lorenzo.
How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank!
Here we will sit and let sounds of music
Creep in our ears; soft stillness and the night
Become the touches [i.e., by the finger on the string] of sweet harmony.
Sit, Jessica.  Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patens of bright gold.
There’s not the smallest orb which thou behold’st
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring [i.e., “choiring”, but with a pun on “book”] to the young-eyed cherubins;
Such harmony is in immortal souls,
But whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it.
Come ho, and wake Diana with a hymn!
With sweetest touches pierce your mistress’ ear
And draw her home with music.

Jessica.
I am never merry when I hear sweet music.

Lorenzo.
The reason is, your spirits are attentive.
For do but note a wild and wanton herd
Or race of youthful and unhandled colts
Fetching mad bounds, bellowing and neighing loud,
Which is the hot condition of their blood;
If they but hear perchance a trumpet sound,
Or any air of music touch their ears,
You shall perceive them make a mutual stand,
Their savage eyes turned to a modest gaze
By the sweet power of music.  Therefore the poet [Homer]
Did feign that Orpheus drew trees, stones, and floods;
Since naught so stockish, hard, and full of rage
But music for the time doth change his nature.
The man that hath no music in himself,
Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, strategems, and spoils;
The motions of his spirits are dull as night,
And his affections dark as Erebus.
Let no such man be trusted.  Mark the music. (V, i 55f.)

There are many points to note about this remarkable passage.  First, though it is a set-piece (which need have no other raison d’etre than the traditional authority of the topos itself), its relevance to the dramatic context is plain enough.  Jessica is the apostate daughter of the Jew Shylock, whose unwillingness to trust and be trusted is proof enough that he has no music in his soul.   He is a devout of a merciless Old Law, a singer of the Old Song, which in Pauline terms, as we’ll see later, means that he is carnal and worldly; he understands only the superficial letter of the Law, the visible outward symbolum but not its invisible inner spirit; and correspondingly, when he reads the book of the world, his eyes are fixed downward upon the earthly visibilia (especially in the form of wealth), rather than upward upon the everlasting treasure of heaven.   Shylock’s Law is purportedly the Law of Justice, but lacking love, it is really only the outward show of justice, which like love, is a condition of concord, of which the harmony of the spheres is the macrocosmic expression.

The main point, however, is that a man has, or should have, this celestial harmony “in him”, “in his immortal soul”, even if it is difficult to detect.  And it is difficult to detect.  When Lorenzo (that is, Shakespeare) explains that the reason we can’t hear it is that “this muddy vesture of decay doth grossly close it in”, he is offering a different explanation, of course, from either Cicero or Aristotle.  Yet, though fifteen hundred years and another religion later, Shakespeare’s is ironically truer to the original Pythagoreo-Platonic ethos out of which our topos first arose.

The harmony of the spheres, says Lorenzo, ought to resonate in the depths of the “immortal soul”, but for the gross material body in which it is enclosed.  Somehow, he implies, the body blocks out the sound.  Lorenzo does not explain in further detail how this occurs, beyond his allusion to the traditional Platonic metaphor of the plight of the embodied soul which is “closed in”, “imprisoned”, or “entombed” by the body.  In a cognate metaphor, the carnal envelope is said to “suffocate” or “extinguish” the immanent scintilla dei, and so alienate the soul from heaven, even as it alienates our secular personalities from our inner divine selves.  The extinction of the fire and obscuration of the light of heaven (causing inner blindness) must then be the ocular equivalent of the deafness of the soul to the harmony of the spheres.

 

In any case, such metaphors, in conjunction with the theme of the inaudibility of the musica mundana, seem to be articulated with the epistemological problem that Socrates identifies in the Phaedo. Here are a couple of representative passages, with which you may already be familiar:

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain, nor again any pleasure,–when she takes leave of the body, and has as little to do with it, when she has no bodily senses or desires, but is aspiring after true being.

***

And he attains to the purest knowledge of [the Ideas] who goes to each with the intellect alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any other sense together with reason, but with the intellect in its purity searches into the truth of each thing in its purity; he who has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they associate with the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge…

***

For the body is the source of countless distractions by reason of the mere requirement of food…it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery….Whence come wars, and conflicts, and factions?  Whence but from the body and the lusts of the body?  All wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired for the sake of the body and in slavish ministration to it; …and even if the body allows us leisure and we betake ourselves to some speculation, it is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our inquiries…

(65c ff.)

The inner reason or intelligence, which is the essential and immortal component of the soul, strives to achieve knowledge of the otherworldly ideas, but the body interposes itself between the two; it cuts off the soul’s access to the heavenly realm in which it was born.  The constant bombardment of stimuli streaming in through the physical senses interferes with the spiritual frequency, so to speak, upon which the reason must tune in the invisibilia.  In order for the inner intellectual faculties to function without such interference, the outer eyes and ears must be tuned out, and the carnal passions must be tranquilized.

In another of those longstanding topoi to which we must return, there is an inverse relationship between the health and vigour of the inner and outer senses.  The man whose outer sight and hearing are acute is usually blind and deaf to the spiritual significance of things, while the man who is physically blind or deaf perceives, with his inner sense of sight and hearing, these hidden mysteries.  Teiresias the prophet is such a blindman who sees farther than those with normal sight; the divine Homer is another, whose blindness, according to the ancient commentators, was compensated by an inner vision with which he surveyed the cosmos from the depths of Tartarus to the summit of Olympus.  (Amongst modern poets, Milton is the son of Homer in this regard).  Oedipus is another legendary example, since he only comes to see the truth after he plucks out his eyes; Shakespeare’s Gloucester is another, who says “I stumbled when I saw”.

And his Jessica, too, seems to belong to this type.  The outwardly sensible earthly music, she says, has no effect on her, because her inner sense of hearing, what Lorenzo call her “spirit”, is already “attentive” to such heavenly melodies as will remain forever inaudible to her seeing and hearing, but spiritually blind and deaf, father.

The Music of the Spheres and the Vanity of Earthly Fame, continued…

Dante…Chaucer…

The Pythagoreo-Platonic Myth of the Celestial Birth of the Soul…

    The insignificance of worldly glory, by comparison to the spatial and temporal vastness of the cosmos, was yet another commonplace of early literature– “part”, as C.S. Lewis says, “of the moralists’ stock-in-trade”–, and it was almost always expressed in conjunction with the topos of the harmony of the spheres. 

This conjunction was more or less assured by the fact that in the last book of Plato’s Republic there is an account of Er’s descent into Hades and his journey to the other world, during which the music of the spheres fills his ears.  Cicero’s Republic is, of course, a self-conscious tribute to Plato’s; Cicero’s, accordingly, must also end with a visionary ascent to the heavens and another statement of the Pythagorean topos of the musica mundana.

Scipio’s was, in fact, the prototype for any number of ascents to heaven in medieval and Renaissance literature, from which vantage point the visionary looks down with scorn upon the meagerness of earthly fame and glory.  Here, for instance, is the once feted, soon to be ignored, artist Oderisi, as he overlooks Italy from the summit of Mount Purgatory in Dante’s Purgatorio, canto 11:

A breath of wind—no more—is earthly fame,
And now this way it blows and that way now,
And as it changes quarter, changes name.
Ten centuries hence, what greater fame hast thou,
Stripping the flesh off late, than if thoud’st died
Ere thou wast done with gee-gee and bow-wow?
Ten centuries hence—and that’s a briefer tide,
Matched with eternity, than one eye-wink
To that wheeled course Heaven’s tardiest sphere must ride. (100 f.)

 

     But there are many other examples.  Less than a century after the publication of the Commedia,Chaucer, in his House of Fame, relates that he was lifted up to heaven in a dream by his mystagogue, the philosophical eagle:

But thus sone in a while he
Was flowen fro the gound so hye
That al the world, as to myn ye,
No more semed than a prikke…

“No wonder”,
Quod he, “for half so high as this
Nas Alixandre Macedo;
Ne the kyng, Daun Scipio,
That  saw in drem, at point devys,
Helle and erthe and paradys” (II, 904f.)

The poet then duly expresses his scorn for earthly vanity, in part by comparing the raucous noise that he hears in the House of Fame with the harmonious melody of the spheres.

Similarly, at the end of Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, the poet records the apotheosis of Troilus’ ghost who, like Scipio, casts his gaze downward from the height of the fixed stars upon “this little spot of erthe”, realizing, in the clarity of mind that comes with his disembodied state–his reason finally liberated from the passions–, how tiny and insignificant it is when measured against the vastness of the cosmos and the eternity of heaven:

And when that he was slayn in this manere,
His lighte goost ful blisfully is went
Up to the holughnesse [concavity] of the eighthe spere,
In convers letyng everich element [leaving every element behind];
And ther he saugh, with ful avysement,
The erratic sterres [wandering planets], herkenyng armonye
With sownes ful of hevenyssh melodie.
And down from thennes faste he gan avyse
This litel spot of erthe that with the se
Embraced is, and fully gan despise
This wrecched world, and held al vanite
To respect of the pleyne felicite
That is in hevene above; and at the laste,
Ther [where] he was slayn his lokyng down he caste,
And in himself he lough right at the wo
Of hem that wepten for his deth so faste,
And dampned al oure werk that foloweth so
The blynde lust, the which that may nat laste,
And sholden al our herte on heven caste.

To “such an end”, continues the narrator, has come all of Troilus’ “great worthiness”, all his wealth, nobility, chivalric prowess, all the useless striving, anxiety, and sorrow occasioned by his merely earthly love for Criseyde (for such is the “world’s brittleness”).  And then he ends with this admonition:

O yonge, freshe folks, he or she,
In which that love up growth with youre age,
Repayreth hom fro worldly vanyte,
And of youre herte up casteth the visage
To thilke God that after his ymage
Yow made, and thynketh al nys but a faire,
This world that passeth soon as floures faire.
(V, 1807ff.)

This, then, is the enduring Platonic note, sounded by the Christian Chaucer in the fourteenth century as it had been sounded by the Roman pagan Cicero in the first century B.C.  In both texts, the topos of the music of the spheres is articulated with a larger mythology and doctrine that assumes that the human soul is in origin and nature heavenly and divine; and that it can, and must, “repair homeward” byaverting its gaze from the false and transient goods of the world in which it is an exile and stranger, andfixing it instead upon the eternal and immutable realities of the divine patria from which it first descended.

According to this doctrine, the temporal world is like a play, a pageant, a fair that comes to town and departs as quickly, a summer flower that soon fades and withers; or, as Theseus’ wise father Egeus expresses the topos at the end of Chaucer’s Knight’s Tale:

This world nys but a thurghfare ful of wo,
And we been pilgrymes, passynge to and fro.

Whatever the conceit of the moralist, the wise man scorns the transience and mutability of the world, casting his gaze upward toward the stability of heaven, in contemplation of which throughout his lifetime, he “repaireth hom”, returns to the place of his soul’s nativity, where he had once enjoyed his true life before his death, exile, and bondage in the body.  We have dealt with these ubiquitous images before.  But inevitably this entire symbol-system is implicit in every reference to the music of the spheres insofar as it was the soul’s birthsong, which it is the wise man’s vocation to remember and amplify to the point of audibility in the midst of the din of this world.

Cicero, as we’ve just seen, repeats Aristotle’s explanation that we can’t hear it because it is inborn and therefore always with us, like the background noise of the bronze foundries that Aristotle says workers learn to tune out, or like the deafening sound of the cataracts of the Nile (in Cicero’s example), with which the local inhabitants have lived all their lives.

Cicero assures us nonetheless that “learned men, by imitating this harmony on stringed instruments and in song, have gained for themselves a return to this region”, and that this redemptive musical regime is conjunctive with the contemplation practiced by “others [who] have obtained the same reward by devoting their brilliant intellects to divine pursuits during their earthly lives”. 

Mathematics…Music…The Harmony of the Spheres…

The Literary Dream Vision…The Vanity of  Earthly Fame…

and

Cicero’s Dream of Scipio…

In the first installment of Involuted Mysteries, we began with the question asked by the earliest Greek philosophers:  What is the universe made of?  One of the recurrent answers of the Pre-Socratics was number.  That, in turn, occasioned our steady march through the numerals one to twelve, which served, if nothing more, as a convenient means of introducing some of the foundational themes and topoi that inevitably presented themselves along the way.

It was Pythagoras, of course, who first posited number as the underlying principle–the Physis or Nature–that governs the orderly operations of the cosmos.  Needless to say, his intuition of the secret mathematical structure of the universe was, for the future of science, momentous.  But Pythagoras was hardly interested in mathematical theory per se.  His discovery of the rudiments of arithmetic and geometry was a by-product, in fact, of his investigations into the secrets of music, our next broad theme.

As we saw when discussing the Seven Liberal Arts, Pythagoras was typically depicted in the sculptural representations of the Arts on the facades of medieval churches as the founder, master, and patron spirit sometimes of Music, sometimes of Arithmetic, sometimes of both.  This is not only because he is the traditional inventor of both of these ancient Arts, but because, from the beginning, he regarded them as mutually interdependent departments of knowledge.

It was Pythagoras who first noted that the principal intervals, the octave, major third, fourth, and fifth, were produced as a function of the ratio or proportion between the length of a string and the length from one end of it to the point at which it is stopped.  Put your finger on a string at its midpoint and the resulting note will be an octave higher than that when you plucked the string unstopped.  This, of course, is a universal physical law.

Pythagoras was probably unaware that it had anything to do with the frequency of the string’s vibration (twice as fast, at half its length); nonetheless, it is impossible to overestimate the significance of his discovery of the mathematical basis of the science of sound as it presaged the mathematical basis of physics, astronomy, and every other branch of scientific inquiry.

As Aristotle writes in his Metaphysics (the first book of which is an invaluable history of philosophy from its beginnings down to his own time in the early fourth century):

The so-called Pythagoreans, having applied themselves to mathematics, first advanced that study; and having been trained in it they thought that the principles of mathematics were the principles of all things.  Since of these principles numbers are by nature first, they thought they saw many similarities to things which exist and come into being in numbers rather than in fire and earth and water—justice being such and such a modification of numbers, soul and reason, being another,…and so with the rest, each being expressible numerically.  Seeing, further, that the properties and ratios of the musical consonances were expressible in numbers, and that indeed all other things seemed to be wholly modeled in their nature upon numbers, they took numbers to be the whole of reality, the elements of numbers to be the elements of all existing things, and the whole heaven to be a musical scale and a number.

Aristotle refers here to the Pythagorean doctrine of the music or harmony of the spheres, which was to become one of the most enduring and popular topoi in Western literature and thought.

 

In his De Caelo, Aristotle gives a somewhat more detailed account of the doctrine:

Some thinkers suppose that the motion of bodies [the stars and planets] so great must produce a noise, since even objects here on earth do so, though they are not equal in bulk to those, nor do they move at such high speeds.  That the sun and moon and stars, so great in number and in size, and moving with so swift a motion, should fail to produce a sound correspondingly great, is (they say) incredible.  On this assumption, then, together with the further assumption that their speeds, as determined by their distances from the centre are in the ratios of the musical consonances, they say that the sound made by the heavenly bodies as they revolve is a harmony.  And in order to account for the fact that we do not hear the sound, they say that it is with us from the moment of birth, so that we are unable to distinguish it from its opposite, silence; for sound and silence are only known by contrast.  Consequently, what happens to us is similar to what happens to workers in bronze, who are so used to noise that they do not notice it.

That the pitch of the sound produced by a revolving object is directly related to its speed was a fact well enough known from ordinary experience.  The Pythagorean philosopher Archytas, who lived from 428 to 347 B.C., and who was a friend of Plato, used the example of the “rhombos”, a liturgical wind instrument whirled about at the end of a stick or string during the celebration of the Eleusinian and Bacchic mysteries, which, Archytas observes, produces a low note when whirled slowly, and a high one when whirled vigorously.  But the speed of the heavenly bodies is in turn a function of their distance “from the centre”, as Aristotle notes—that is, from the earth.  For Pythagoras, the rotation of the seven planets and fixed stars about the earth was assumed to be in the same plane, and each of the eight spheres was also assumed to complete its revolution over the same period.  To keep their position relative to one another, the outermost spheres—those closer to the circumference–must naturally revolve more swiftly than those closer to the centre, just as a point along the spoke of a wagon wheel that is near the felloe or tire must move more swiftly than a point near the hub.  For this reason, they produced different pitches:  the moon (that is to say, the planet that is closest to the earth) producing the lowest, and the Stellatum or sphere of the fixed stars, which is farthest from the earth (on the very circumference of the cosmos) producing the highest.

One of the classic statements of this topos is found in Cicero’s Dream of Scipio, a text to which you may have already heard me refer many times in previous courses, because, as is the nature of seminal texts, it so perfectly recapitulates an otherwise complex philosophical tradition.  We need to look carefully at this text insofar as it demonstrates that the doctrine of the music of the spheres, like all “merely” cosmological doctrines, is at root a religious or mythological symbol, amongst many that belong to a more or less universal ancient method for the salvation of the soul.

Cicero’s Dream is the principal remaining fragment of the sixth and final book of his Republic.  In the dialogue, the speaker Scipio the Younger relates that while serving as a military tribune in Africa, he met King Massinissa, whose hereditary territory Scipio Africanus the Elder (Scipio the Younger’s eminent namesake and adoptive grandfather) had restored.  They spend the day in conversation, reminiscing about the deeds of Scipio’s glorious ancestor, and then, after dinner, as the speaker relates, “the following dream came to me, prompted, I suppose, by the subject of our conversation; for it often happens that our thoughts and words have some such effect in our sleep…”   In the dream, the spirit of Scipio the Elder duly appears to him, looking down from his eternal abode in the eighth sphere.

 

Scipio’s explanation that dreams are fecundated by our recent waking preoccupations was a commonplace of traditional dream theory, which is in itself a topic so ubiquitous that we’ll have at some point to return to it.  But, for now, a couple of examples should suffice to illustrate both the influence of Cicero’s Somnium and the tendency of early literature to rehearse such conventional themes.

In Chaucer’s Parliament of Foules, the poet-narrator reads the Somnium Scipionis itself, a summary of whose doctrine he provides.  While still pondering his reading matter, he falls asleep and has a dream in which, none other than Scipio Africanus appears to him.  Indeed, as the poet explains, it is because he had been reading the Dream of Scipio that his own dream takes the form that it does.

Here, of course, Chaucer is merely repeating the pattern of the Dream of Scipio, in which Scipio the Younger dreams about Scipio the Elder after having a conversation about him the afternoon before.

One other example comes immediately to mind, this also from Chaucer.  In the Proem to Chaucer’s Book of the Duchess, the poet-narrator picks up his volume of Ovid’s Metamorphoses in the hope that it will help him fall asleep (not the greatest compliment he might have paid to Ovid, who was held in high reverence in the Middle Ages).  By chance, his eyes alight upon the myth of Ceyx and Alcyone.

Ceyx and Alcyone, as the narrator paraphrases Ovid, are the king and queen of Thessaly, and so much in love that they were never willingly apart.  But Ceyx decides that he must depart on a long sea voyage to consult the Delphic oracle.  As the daughter of Aeolus, king of the winds, Alcyone knows how perilous the sea can be, and full of foreboding, she tries to dissuade her husband from embarking.  And indeed when he does, that very night, there is a monstrous storm, which sinks his ship and all its crew.

Ceyx dies with the name of his beloved Alcyone on his lips.  Every day thereafter, Alcyone waits anxiously, weaving a beautiful robe in expectation of Ceyx’ return—the Penelope motif–, going down to the shore in hopes of spotting her husband’s ship, and praying to Juno for his safe return.  When Juno hears her prayers, she takes pity upon her, sending Iris, the messenger goddess, to the house of Somnus, god of sleep, bidding that he send Alcyone a dream in which she might learn of Ceyx’ death.

Somnus is awoken painfully by Iris—a typical flourish of Ovidian humour–, but accepts the commission, which he then hands on to his son Morpheus, who is able to take the shape of anyone at will.  Morpheus is finally awoken with equal difficulty, but promptly assumes the shape of Ceyx, and appearing to Alcyone in a dream, tells her to wait for him no longer, for he has drowned, and must now descend into the underworld.  Ceyx-Morpheus then assures her of his undying love, begs that she accept his death with equanimity, and vanishes.

The news, however, only makes Alcyone go mad with grief, and determine to join him in the kingdom of the dead.  But when she goes down to the shore with the intention of throwing herself into the sea, she sees the corpse of her husband drifting landward.  Then, as Ovid ends the story in his usual way, the gods take pity on them both, metamorphosing them into birds, who are always thereafter seen together.  Their permanent reunion in avian form is the reason why every winter there are seven days of perfect sunshine and calm, the days during which Alcyone broods over her nest, called, therefore, Halcyon days.  Again, this is the typical Ovidian coda, and a perfect example of what mythologists call an “aetiological myth”, i.e., one that is invented to explain some ritual or tradition whose original meaning has been lost in the mists of time.

This, then, is the poet’s bedtime reading.  After retailing the myth, he says that he becomes so drowsy that he falls asleep right upon his book, and dreams.  The content of his dream is, of course, Chaucer’s Book of the Duchess, which tells the story of the untimely death of Chaucer’s patroness Blanch, the Duchess of Gaunt, wife of Duke John of Gaunt, whose love and devotion to one another was as celebrated as that between Ceyx and Alcyone.

The Book of the Duchess is thus an elegy, cast in the form of a dream, whose purpose is to console John of Gaunt and Chaucer himself, both bereft by the death of a beloved lady, just as in the Ovidian myth which the poet had been reading before falling asleep, Alcyone is bereft by the death of her beloved husband Ceyx, who appears to her in a dream meant to console her.

 

But the nature and classification of dreams is, as I said, another ancient and longstanding topos, a fuller discussion of which we will have to postpone until later.  Let us return, then, to the Dream of Scipioand the harmony of the spheres.

In his dream, Scipio beholds his famous ancestor standing before him, and enumerating the great military and political deeds that his grandson will in due course accomplish; (and since Cicero wrote hisRepublic nearly a century after the death of Scipio the Younger, these predictions turn out to be uncannily accurate).

This half-humorous motive, too, is conventional, the most celebrated instance of which is the panoramic prophecy revealed by the ghost of Aeneas’ father Anchises of his son’s, and Rome’s, glorious future, in the sixth book of Virgil’s Aeneid, in which Anchises “predicts” the history of Rome from the time of its establishment down, by sheer coincidence, to Virgil’s own day.

There are innumerable other examples, of course, including Paradiso canto 17, in which the spirit of Cacciaguida foretells the eternal fame of Dante the poet—a prophetic self-compliment–, but I merely note these in passing as another commonplace of pre-modern literature.

Scipio then advises his descendant that nothing is more pleasing to the gods than the just and benevolent administration of the commonwealth, whose rulers “have a special place reserved for them in the heavens, where they may enjoy an eternal life of happiness”.  This place, he says, reiterating the Orpheo-Pythagoreo-Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of souls in the other world and their return thereto, is the place from which just rulers first descended to earth, and the place to which, after death, they will repair.

Scipio then asks whether his grandfather and father Paulus are really still alive, and he is told emphatically:  Surely all those are alive who have escaped from the bondage of the body as from a prison; but that life of yours, which men so call, is really death.”  If this is so, asks Scipio the Younger, why should he not commit suicide in order to “hasten thither to you”.

Scipio the Elder then enumerates the reasons for the prohibition against suicide, the same reasons given by Socrates when asked the same question by his interlocutor Cebes in a passage that occurs early in Plato’s Phaedo, the passage upon which Cicero has self-consciously modeled this section of theDream:

“Not so, for unless God, whose temple is everything that you see, has freed you from the prison of the body, you cannot gain entrance there.  For man was given life that he might inhabit that sphere called Earth, which you see in the centre of this temple; and he has been given a soul out of those eternal fires which you call stars and planets, which, being round and globular bodies animated by divine intelligences, circle about in their fixed orbits with marvelous speed.  Wherefore you, Publius, and all good men, must leave that soul in the custody of the body, and must not abandon human life except at the behest of him by whom it was given you, lest you appear to have shirked the duty imposed upon man by God.”

That duty, as Scipio explains, is twofold:  The first duty is the cultivation of virtue and wisdom, by which the soul prepares itself in this living death for the true life of the other world.  The second, of course, is service to the commonwealth, so that under the guidance of wise rulers, its citizens might live in justice and harmony.   (Inasmuch as the Christian prohibition against suicide probably comes from this passage, it is not surprising to find the same reasoning, expressed in terms of military duty, implicit in the words of  Redcross Knight’s admonition, who answers Despair’s temptation to suicide in Spenser’s sixteenth-century poem, The Faerie Queene:

The souldier may not move from watchfull sted
Nor leave his stand until his Captaine bid
FQ I, xi 41)

By this point in his dream, Scipio the Younger has presumably been exalted to the side of his grandfather in heaven, and from this superior perspective he overlooks the vastness of the cosmos.  What follows is an epitome of Ptolemaic astronomy, replete, as always, with the traditional moral and psychological assumptions of which the pre-modern model of the cosmos is the projected image:

     When I gazed in every direction from that point, all else appeared wonderfully beautiful. There were stars which we never see from the earth, and they were all larger than we have ever imagined.  The smallest of them was that farthest from heaven and nearest the earth which shone with a borrowed light [i.e., the Moon].  The starry spheres were much larger than the earth; indeed the earth itself seemed to me so small that I was scornful of our empire, which covers only a single point, as it were, upon its surface.

As I gazed still more fixedly at the earth, Africanus said:  “How long will your thoughts be fixed upon the lowly earth?  Do you not see what lofty regions you have entered?  These are the nine circles, or rather spheres, by which the whole is joined.  One of them, the outermost, is that of heaven; it contains all the rest, and is itself the supreme God, holding and embracing within itself all the other spheres; in it are fixed the eternal revolving courses of the stars. Beneath it are seven other spheres which revolve in the opposite direction to that of heaven. One of these globes is that light which on earth is called Saturn’s.  Next comes the star called Jupiter’s, which brings fortune and health to mankind.  Beneath it is that star, red and terrible to the dwellings of man, which you assign to Mars.  Below it and almost midway of the distance [i.e., between God’s heaven at the circumference and earth at the centre] is the Sun, the lord, chief, and ruler of the other lights, the mind and guiding principle of the universe, of such magnitude that he reveals and fills all things with his light.  He is accompanied by his companions, as it were—Venus and Mercury in their orbits, and in the lowest sphere revolves the Moon, set on fire by the rays of the Sun.  But below the Moon there is nothing except what is mortal and doomed to decay, save only the souls given to the human race by the bounty of the gods, while above the Moon all things are eternal.   For the ninth and central sphere, which is the earth, is immovable and the lowest of all, and toward it all ponderable bodies are drawn by their own natural tendency downward.”

After recovering from the astonishment with which I viewed these wonders, I said:  “What is this loud and agreeable sound that fills my ears?”

“That is produced”, he replied, “by the onward rush and motion of the spheres themselves; the intervals between them, though unequal, being exactly arranged in a fixed proportion, by an agreeable blending of high and low tones various harmonies are produced; for such mighty motions cannot be carried on so swiftly in silence; and Nature has provided that one extreme shall produce low tones while the other gives forth high.  Therefore this uppermost sphere of heaven, which bears the stars, as it revolves more rapidly, produces a high, shrill tone, whereas the lowest revolving sphere, that of the Moon, gives forth the lowest tone; for the earthly sphere, the ninth, remains ever motionless and stationary, in its position in the centre of the universe.  But the other eight spheres…produce seven different sounds—a number which is the key of almost everything.  Learned men, by imitating this harmony on stringed instruments and in song, have gained for themselves a return to this region, as others have obtained the same reward by devoting their brilliant intellects to divine pursuits during their earthly lives.  Men’s ears, ever filled with this sound, have become deaf to it…We find a similar phenomenon where the Nile rushes down from those lofty mountains at the place called Catadupa [i.e., the cataracts of the Nile]; the people who live nearby have lost their sense of hearing on account of the loudness of the sound.  But this mighty music, produced by the revolution of the whole universe at the highest speed, cannot be perceived by human ears, any more than you can look straight at the Sun, your sense of sight being overpowered by its radiance.”

While gazing at these wanders, I was repeatedly turning my eyes back to earth.  Then Africanus resumed:

“I see that you are still directing your gaze upon the habitation and abode of men.  If it seems small to you, as it actually is, keep your gaze fixed upon those heavenly things and scorn the earthly…”

The Dream then goes on to dilate upon the theme of human vanity; his grandson, having already noted that by comparison to the stars the earth was so small that the Roman Empire–which was hardly more than a point on its tiny surface–excited his contempt, Scipio the Elder now points out that only a few small regions of our miniscule globe inhabited by men, to which the fame of the most glorious amongst them is limited.  Indeed, a man may be famous in one city, and completely unknown in an adjoining province.  Moreover, every time the world is periodically destroyed by conflagration or flood, and renewed throughout the recurrent cycle of death and rebirth, a man’s fame is utterly obliterated.  How insubstantial a thing is earthly fame, then, which can hardly last a single year, compared with the great or revolving year when the stars and planets return to their original configuration, and the cycle finally ends.

In the nineteen-seventies, the beau monde decided that Toronto was a “world-class city”.  Only those who had been born here, and never wandered farther afield than Tonawanda, N.Y., could possibly have failed to recognize this as jingoistic flapdoodle.  Yet the mantra continues to be intoned to this day by local politicians, multi-cult cultists, and self-lauding residents alike.

The essays that follow are intended for those who might be interested in a few thoughts about real world-class cities.  (A version of the first, on Paris, was originally published in The IDLER in 1985.  But then real world-class cities don’t change much over a mere quarter-century…) 

 

PARIS

      Paris is a city of style.  Now style is to beauty what art is to nature.  Specifically, style is to be distinguished from beauty because it requires that beautiful elements be also beautifully arranged.  Helen of Troy was beautiful.  For Helen to have had style, Paris would have had to have kidnapped her to, well, Paris, and taken her on a spree on the Rue de la Paix.

      The visitor to Paris discerns no single regnant fashion, except elegance.  It is remarkable, for instance, that both Parisian men and women are fascinated by such North American vulgarities as punk and urban grunge; but neither can pull them off.  They insist on civilizing their essential brutality (they are Parisians, after all), and so transform them beyond recognition.

     The exigencies of style affect every aspect of behaviour.  To Parisians, walking is less a means of transit than of self-expression.  There is no manifest intention of getting somewhere, as with other urbanites.  Down the sidewalks or across the streets, Parisians proceed more or less as Narcissus would if he were sipping cognac in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.

     There are, in fact, numerous reasons for the Parisians’ slowness of gait.  1. You do not tell gorgeousness to move along.  2. There are constant disembarkations at the terasse.  (Parisians need to be fed coffee before exerting themselves to roll over in bed at night.)  3. Such is the vestigial sway of courtoisie, that on the sidewalks Parisians are always stopping to excuse themselves, under the moral anxiety of brushing another pedestrian’s arm.  (The contrast with North America is dramatic.  In New York or Toronto, pedestrians would never say excuse me, even if they were on their way to confession.)

     Neither courtesy nor caution applies to the driving of cars, however, where style demands danger, and the top-of-the-line Peugeot unleashes floods of masculinity.  H.G. Wells, the world-class atheist, once said that he did not dare to drive a motorcar in the streets of Paris for fear of succumbing to temptation and running over a priest.  Among native Frenchmen, there has been no abatement of anti-clerical sentiment since the Revolution.  And motorists in Paris continue to drive as if it were still a cathedral town, and every pedestrian hid a tonsure beneath his chapeau.

     From atop the Eiffel Tower, certain intersections in Paris resemble a giant game of Pac-Man.  Traversing the Place de la Concorde is either an act of Promethean bravado, or final submission.  If the welfare government in France were truly caring, it would install a psychotherapist on every corner (about sixteen) to try to talk pedestrians down.

 

     All of this is rather daunting to the tourist, I’m afraid.  But Paris is not for tourists, at least not that part of it that depends upon the goodwill of the natives.  The tourist does not visit Paris; it occasionally grants him an audience.

      The museums, for instance, might be open, or they might not, depending upon how they feel when they get up in the morning.  The first time I went to the City of Light, the Louvre guards were out en greve; the next time, the doors were shut in solidarity with a national truckers’ strike.  Just before the time of writing this (March, 1985), my visit was aborted by a student day of action against government “austerity” measures.  (When it comes to the eternal protest against putative threats to the nanny state, no one can doubt the wisdom of the French expression, plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose.)

     It is thus part of the Paris style, it seems, to be generally exclusive.  Do not try, for instance, to eat in Paris.  When a North American enters a French restaurant he is treated as Australopithecus would be by the Dean of Admissions at Harvard.  The Revolution issued promissory notes for liberte, egalite, and fraternite; but egalite and fraternite are non-negotiable by the non-French.  Foreigners are extended the liberte to be themselves, which is to say, unequal, and therefore, unfraternized.  If President Roosevelt had walked, chest-proud, into a Paris bistro immediately following the liberation of France, he would have been led to a table by the kitchen.

     All in all, it may be best for the tourist to forget the Parisians.  This is not to be taken as the ossified Anglo-Saxon prejudice against the Frogs, which is at best an inverted snobbery.  I offer it as a general prophylactic when visiting world-class cities.  After all, the people will come and go; the buildings (and in Paris, the buildings are considerably more friendly) will endure more or less forever.

 

     Someone once said that architecture is the science of style built to last.  There is certainly a sense in which Parisians, generation after generation, are shamed into their gorgeousness by the buildings.

     I admit that I find old buildings titillating.  There are others of similar orientation in every quarter of the globe; but as a group, we have yet to come out of the closet.  Many of us are forced to lead a double life.  On my first trip to Europe (my honeymoon), I took seven hundred slides of buildings and six of my wife.  During each of these essays in family portraiture, I aimed the camera affectionately in her direction; but the truth is, I used her for scale.

     What is it that makes European cities so seductive?  That they are old?  This is part of it; but then the Canadian Shield is old, and to the lovers of architecture, such untutored grandeur succeeds merely in inducing frozen fits of agoraphobia.  Rather, that they offer the visitor that reassuring sense of enclosure promised by his gestation.

     In European streets the eye is freighted down an unbroken line of facades.  Humbly, individual buildings march up to, but not beyond, a solid street wall, under an ancient urban obligation.  This is a visual datum with which the semi-rusticated inhabitants of Toronto or Atlanta are unfamiliar.  In such a neoteric birthplace, the infant will tumble directly from the womb into an open-concept daycare centre, his trauma later reinforced by widened sidewalks, herniated streetscapes, concrete office plazas, low-density-zoning set-backs, fully-detached homes, freeways, parking lots, and commercial towers that (in deference to the sun) retreat from corners like Dracula from the Cross.  (Professor Eric Arthur, remarking on the amount of “open space” in the downtown core, said that Toronto reminded him of London after the blitz.)  In North America, what we have are half-cities, hybrid monsters of architecture’s me-generation, meccano-assembled by town planners with claustrophobic inclinations, Arcadian fantasies, sociological backgrounds, and suburban minds.

 

     Paris, by contrast, offers the visitor an almost perfect urban snugness.  There are streets here so narrow that the anorexic models have to turn sideways.  In some quarters, like the Marais, you don’t walk down the streets, you slip them on.

     There are also superhuman vistas here, the kind that make one think that if God had wished to design an approach to the Primum Mobile, he might have hired Mansart or Vicomte–when the visitor perches on the banks of the Seine, for instance, or when he turns around to look back at the Hotel des Invalides, or the Palais de Luxembourg.  But even these vast expanses are relentlessly enclosed, making one feel humble, but not hopeless, a free agent, but not abandoned to the existential void.

     Preserving the seamless Parisian streetscape was the probable cynosure when France surrendered early in Wold War II.  Other great European cities must put up with anachronistic intrusions until the next world war.  Passing one of those high-tech piles heaped up by post-bellum modernists in their experimentation on the natives of Berlin, a bus tour companion asked trenchantly:  “What’s the point in bombing out whole sectors of a city if you’re only going to replace them with stuff like that?”

     Ironically, nothing so inspires a love of the past as an unlovely present.  Thus North American tourists, who profess to love novelty, flock to such cities as Paris as to havens from it.  Here, there are only a few gleaming glass boxes, and modernity, when it is suffered, is usually exiled to the periphery, where it stands like the crested helmets of some new envious barbarism.

A Postscript

Being paragons of rationality, the enemies of religion affect genuine bafflement as to why anyone would practise it. Whereupon they proceed to enumerate a long list of what are usually evil or ulterior motives. It’s odd. If I were honestly unable to conceive of the reasons for some archaic habit or custom–why people take snuff, let us say–I wouldn’t set myself up as an authority on the subject. Yet atheists profess to know that theists worship God out of some vestigial anxiety to propitiate the forces of nature, or to take out insurance against the contingency of damnation, or, if they are clerics, to wield religion as an instrument of power. They are about as credible on the subject of the origin of religion as The League Of Offended Housewives To Snuff Out Snuff would be if they were to admonish that snuff-taking makes you blind. It is time, it seems to me, for the defenders of religion to begin speculating, mutatis mutandis, on the motives of its enemies.

As Joe Sobran has observed in his essay The Sins of Irreligion:

I can imagine one kind of atheist–let us call him the “pious atheist”–who arrives at his unbelief without joy, simply as an intellectual conclusion. I suppose such a man would regard Christian civilization with the kind of affection and respect a Roman convert to Christianity in Augustine’s day would feel for the dying Roman Empire, for Cicero and Virgil and Marcus Aurelius. He would feel that, although that world had passed away, it had left much of enduring value. We actually do see pious atheists who may regret the Inquisition but who also cherish Dante, Monteverdi, Spenser, Milton, Bach, Handel, and Dr. Johnson. To cease believing in the viability of this Christian civilization is not necessarily either to condemn it or to assume an attitude of enmity toward it.

Yet there is another sort of atheist who does regard himself as Christendom’s enemy. Far from cherishing its past, he condemns it and would wipe out every trace of it: the Catholic Church, the Moral Majority, the inscription “In God We Trust”. He thinks that humanity is now free at last from dogma and superstition, and he would get on with the business of creating a new world on progressive and scientific principles.

No one who cherishes the intellectual, literary, and artistic bequests of religion would object to the first group identified by Sobran. Aligned with them are any number of brilliant scholars of religious history and thought, including some of the most humane and capacious minds of the modern age: Jung, Bultmann, Tillich, Hugo Rahner, Simone Weil, to name just a few.

All such thinkers accept as a brute fact the sceptical scientific spirit of the modern epoch. All agree that a naively literal belief in the affirmations of organized religion is no longer intellectually possible, and plead, instead, for the renewal of a mythic or allegorical approach to sacred narrative that is already native to the Christian tradition.

Of this tradition, however, Dawkins and Hitchens are conveniently ignorant. To carry Christianity’s colours against their hollow challenge, they naturally prefer their own reductive caricature of the Bible-thumping Southern televangelist. When they limn the portrait of a rotten Christianity on such bases, they invite Chaucer’s Pardoner to sit as their model, as though his Parson, Clerk, and Knight were not also on the Canterbury road.

 

That sort of selectivity alone suggests that Dawkins and Hitchens are motivated by an animus that is less than objective or scientific. Unlike Sobran’s “pious atheists” or the scholarly taxonomists of religious ideas mentioned above, they are less observers of Christianity’s decline and fall than agents who yearn to hasten it. They arrive at their atheist position, not as an intellectual conclusion, but a morally triumphant one. Indeed, it places them squarely on the side the angels–to summon a theistic phrase–in the great millennial struggle between the forces of light and superstitious darkness. Nor does their atheism betray the least willingness to assimilate anything of the legacy of Christianity, not even those elements that Christianity itself willingly assimilated from its pagan past (including symbols as innocuous as Christmas trees).

In this regard, today’s atheists usually see themselves as “free-thinkers” and “progressives”. Save that free-thought is hardly ever progressive, except in the self-congratulatory sense in which that term is used. It cannot be so because, as Chesterton has observed, “it will accept nothing from the past; it begins every time again from the beginning; and it goes every time in a different direction.” The only things that have “progressed” have done so by gradual “accumulations of authority”, advancing incrementally “in a certain definable direction”. (Christian Civilization is, in that sense, progressive; by contrast, the atheist desire to undo it is as unprogressive as that of the fantasist who decides to tear up the road by which mankind has advanced and recommend that we grow wings instead.)

 

Their furious antagonism toward religious tradition in general and Christian Civilization in particular tells us as much about contemporary atheists as it does about the object of their hatred. Sobran identifies the animus of the current militant sect of atheists as a species of that genus of thought which he calls “alienism”, the willful disaffection from the norms and institutions of society typical of Western intellectuals and so-called “minority” groups.

The modern alienist’s sense of estrangement need not, of course, have anything to do with historical oppression or ostracism by an unjust majority (indeed, his embitterment suggests that he wants in). The designation “minority” itself, as Sobran observes, alludes less to a real statistical fact than an ideological posture. Some “minorities” (e.g. women) are in fact majorities. Others, such as “gays”, are hardly condemned to their supposed alienation by the cruel accident of birth (like the victims of racism), but by voluntary choice. Meanwhile, any number of actual numerical minorities are never thought of as such; in this category, Sobran mentions Mormons–whom it is always safe to deride–, to which I would add native born whites in many large North American cities.

However imprecise the term, it invariably irradiates a palpable sense of disaffection, which is presumed to be justified by the minority’s victimization by a homogeneous majority. Historically (at least in the West), that means Christianity, so that “if we look more closely”, as Sobran argues, “we will find that the very idea of a minority in this sense is largely a rhetorical device for covertly attacking what remains of the Christian culture”.

In contemporary identity politics, it is obvious enough that minorities from non-Christian cultures have become stalking-horses for anti-Christian alienism. It was less than fifty years ago that non-Christian communities were expected, if not actively to adopt the beliefs and mores of the Christian Civilization to which they desired admittance, then at least not to object to them. Today, the mere existence of a native Christian remnant constitutes an affront to multicultural sensibilities, if not to the hallowed principles of equality and pluralism. The expectation that minorities should accommodate the dominant culture of their new homelands once seemed only reasonable; now it is the majority that must accommodate the minority.

Atheists function in this regard as a non-Christian “minority”. Because they once were so, Dawkins and Hitchens see atheists as permanent victims. It’s a truism, of course, that when public opinion finally rouses itself in indignant protest against the victimization of this group or that, their victimization is largely a thing of the past. When minorities are really being mistreated by majorities–systematically murdered, enslaved, lynched, or discriminated against–public opinion either fails to notice or actively colludes with what it regards as merely normative. Once the public gets around to expressing its collective moral outrage, one can be assured that it is already safe to do so.

So it is, of course, with those who now imagine theocrats hiding under every bed, and stand eternally vigilant in the defence of the temporal state against the phantom encroachment of spiritual powers: they are permitted to complain against “theocracy” only because there are no theocrats about with the power to silence them. (In the Middle Ages, Dawkins and Hitchens might have had a point, but no one could have heard them making it beyond the confines of their prison cells.)

If anything, the contemporary incarnation of the Spanish Inquisition is run by the priests of a militant secular orthodoxy who can abide no dissent from what they regard as religious heretics (i.e., heretics whose sin is believing in religion per se, rather than false religion). In the past several decades in Canada, every vestige of Christian symbolism has been extirpated from the public square, Christian teaching in schools has been officially proscribed by the State, and dozens of supposedly free citizens have been arraigned before our official human rights tribunals for professing their religious beliefs. Notably, during the same period, not a single atheist has had to appear before these human rights constabularies. If anyone has a right to fear the “establishment of religion”, it is the victims of the new secular orthodoxy.

Today, Christians remain one the few identifiable groups against which it is legitimate to be bigoted. When alienist intellectuals tell us that “the white race is the cancer of history”, or accuse Europeans of wholesale and deliberate genocide in the New World, or malign the masculine gender as war-mongering rapists–using “white race”, or “European”, or “male” as obvious proxies for historical Christendom–, “we are hearing something other than the voice of the disinterested intellect. We are hearing an expression of nihilistic hatred.” Mere intellectual dissent from the credenda of religion does not, as Sobran observes, inspire “this kind of fanaticism.”

Sobran wonders reasonably enough why we have been so slow to recognize and declaim against this sort of fanatical hatred as a real social problem, if not a psychopathology. The terms of alienist bitterness and grievance are by now epidemic in our language–“racism”, “sexism”, “homophobia”, “anti-Semitism”, “nativism”, “Eurocentrism”, “Christocentrism”, “ethnocentrism”, “xenophobia”, “bigotry”, “prejudice”, “discrimination”, “stereotyping”. Even the word “hatred” itself has taken on the same victimological and anti-majoritarian connotations, though it should be entirely possible that enmity between social groups can have the opposite valency. Can minority races, cultures, or religions never be guilty of prejudice or hatred against majorities? If so, as Sobran points out, “we have no specific vocabulary at all to suggest this reciprocal possibility”.

Until recently, alienist hatred was recognized as a dangerous toxin, destabilizing not only to society but to the moral and psychological health of the subject. Sobran mentions Shakespeare’s villains Edmund and Iago–whose villainy consists precisely in their obsessive hostility to all social norms and traditions. “Almost without exception”, Sobran observes, “Shakespeare’s ‘alienated’ characters are villains”. Both Shakespeare and his audience evidently still considered such attitudes dangerous and deranged, and felt that Civilization had every right to defend itself against them. Thus, “The assumptions embodied in the very structure of these plays are directly opposed to the assumption that hatred and hostility are always to be imputed to society. The imputation itself expresses hostility, and we do well to raise our guard against it.”

We do well, that is, to expose and condemn the militant hatred of Christendom expressed by atheists like Dawkins and Hitchens as a poison just as lethal as any majoritarian “ism”.

Going Naked to a Funeral

     The National Post acknowledged that this year’s March for Life in Ottawa saw a record turnout, easily “eclipsing” (in the words of Campaign Life Coalition president Jim Hughes) last year’s crowd of 12,500.  The Post‘s sub-heading exerted itself to explain the quantum increase:  “Bused-in teens swell [inflate?] the ranks on Parliament Hill”.  If it hadn’t come from the normally friendly National Post, I would have taken this as the usual scoffing qualifier of a pro-abortion partisan.

As a participant in the March, I can attest that the numbers this year were impressive.  But “bused-in teens”, mostly from local Catholic schools, did indeed inflate the ranks; and though no one wants to rain on his own parade, their giggling and jiggling presence ought to have given the Movement pause.

Busing in teens, of course, has been the strategic resort of protesters on the Left; and the critics of the Left have rightly condemned it as morally disreputable. During the Cold War, we all remember seeing children who had not yet reached the age of reason deployed as props in little anti-American morality plays.  What did these youthful idiots (with apologies to Lenin for the pun) know about capitalism, socialism, totalitarianism, the Gulag, or mutual assured destruction?   The shameless exploitation of children by the Left has hardly abated since.  Today, seniors who have lived through the serial hardships of war, dislocation, and depression are hectored by their infant great-grandchildren on the sacred obligations of recycling, and the finer points of climate change.

In Ottawa, alas, the only mark of coherence in the pre-march rally was that nauseating pandering to “young people” that has been the leitmotive of every leftist demonstration from the love-ins of the Woodstock generation to the hopey-changey mob ecstasies that exalted Obama into sainthood and the presidency.

From the pinched sonorities of her Valley girl voice–I was too far away to see her–, I gathered that our mistress of ceremonies at the rally was another pubescent teen attempting to compensate for bad grammar, vulgar usage, and intellectual vapidity with ear-splitting volume in the cause of forced enthusiasm.  The microphone was then handed over to another pubescent female who mutilated the national anthem in the now-canonical, tarted-up rendition warbled by every other North American teen starlet prior to the start of every televised sporting event.

Each of the speakers then formulaically, but in the, like, totally cool lingo of youth, gushed over the number of young people in attendance (“amazing”, “awesome”), and one, an MP, invited them to give themselves a round of applause–which, naturally, these imminent graduates of Self-Esteem High were only too happy to do.  Another MP pointed to the Parliament Buildings behind him and told them that this was “their house”, and they “should take it”:  a prospect that, for me at least, was a little too reminiscent of the ageist revolutionary brutality of the gun-toting ten-year-olds of the Great Leap Forward, the Shining Path, and the Khmer Rouge.

The same political pander subsequently exulted at the record number of young people who had just been elected to Parliament, apparently forgetting that all of them ran for the NDP (a party not well-known for its defence of life or other fundaments of Christian morality).   Do we really want to identify  “our” young people with the student-council Communists and bar-tending, single-mother Vegas junketeers that make up the risibly under-qualified new parliamentary cohort?  Is that the sort of youth-culture the Pro-Life Movement wishes to emulate?

Apparently so.  On the Hill, a significant plurality of the teens I saw were spread-eagled on the grass in evident boredom, obliviously chatting and giggling amongst themselves, staring fixedly at their iPhones or listening to the tunes on their iPods (these, the visual and auditory pacifiers of an arguably pathologically self-absorbed generation), and generally disporting themselves as though they were in Ottawa because it meant a day off school.  Many of the female students were adherents of the obligatory modern Whore of Babylon school of fashion:  frayed short-shorts, so tight as to accentuate both posterior and anterior nether cleavages, and sleeveless shrink-wrap tops with bra straps and bra-contents protruding fetchingly.  These girls, especially those who were also defiantly proud of their obesity, certainly “swelled the ranks”.   But the moral irony clearly escaped both them and their recruiters.  Might not their “Catholic” school teachers, or the march organizers, have pointed out that there is a connection between rampant abortion–used as a disinfectant for the messy by-products of rampant sex–, and what  Christians once quaintly referred to as “wantonness”?   Soi disant Christians can inveigh against abortion all they like, but if they insouciantly conform themselves to the permanently engorged sexual culture that breeds abortion in the first place, they convict themselves of rank hypocrisy.  The words of the Gospel about casting the first stone come to mind.

As the marchers passed the inevitable ambush of pro-abortion protesters, snarling their abuse from behind police barricades like caged animals straining to get at their prey, it was impossible not to be taken aback by the feral sexuality to which they gave voice.  PRO SEX, PRO QUEER, PRO CHOICE, shouted one sign; IF YOU CUT OFF MY REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE, CAN I CUT OFF YOURS?, threatened another.  The most honest and philosophical of them stipulated:  SEX IS BEAUTIFUL; REPRODUCTION IS OPTIONAL. Personifying this doctrine, like the female moral allegories of ancient and medieval art, were two bare-breasted goddesses, swinging their tassled nipples menacingly at their enemies.  As they took note of the sluttishly-attired teens on the pro-life side of the barricades, I couldn’t help but wonder if these goddesses were at the same time concluding triumphantly, as I concluded desolately, that the culture wars were over.

The response from our pro-life teens to this evidently uncomprehended moral symmetry was another of those infantile boot-camp marching songs typically chanted by the interminably protesting Left:

We–are–pro–life,
Mighty–mighty–pro–life,
If you–can’t–hear–us,
We’ll shout–a lit–tle loud–er.

Please.  Let’s leave the shouting to the other side, shall we?  For ourselves, let us rather cultivate reason, fortitude, and quiet contemplation.

     And then, finally, came a moment of seriousness that erupted into the silliness like an epiphany from on high.  As the teen chanting subsided, the marchers filed past the grisly photographic images of the dismembered and re-assembled corpses of aborted children, butchered after a mere ten to twenty weeks.  The images were clinical, almost paleontological, but for all that, umistakably and undeniably human.  The bloody lacerations and disfigurements that they bore were also provocatively lurid–in the way, I suppose, that the wounds of Christ must have seemed almost deliberately lurid to His tormentors.  Yet these few photographs testified with greater eloquence and honesty to the moral enormity of abortion than all the earlier reassuring encomia of youth and euphoric exclamations at their multitudinous presence put together.

One would expect that a pro-life march ought to have something of the solemnity of a funeral rite.  In the Movement, after all, we pay our respects–however belated and inadequate–, to the millions of aborted human beings, nameless and unloved, whose deaths, like their births, were stripped of every ceremony and dignity.  We remember that abortion is a double tragedy:  denying its victims birth in the world, and then cheating them of a decent burial.  Who would have thought that they would be cheated of this dignity yet again, by their own pro-life champions?

Imagine…

With the puer aeternus John Lennon, Dawkins invites us to “imagine a world without religion”. All right. Then imagine it without architecture, sculpture, painting, or poetry. Imagine it without music, and inasmuch as Western music – even the insipid doggerel of the Beatles – is the product of an ancient liturgical tradition, imagine it without Lennon.

On the Singing Sage of Liverpool, it is hard to resist quoting the bravely non-conformist comments of clinical psychologist Jordan Peterson:

But what did he mean by “no religion”, anyway? No religious institutions? Everyone but the personality-disordered anarchist understands that institutions are necessary.

No religious experience? Lennon constantly sought religious experience, through mysticism and psychedelic drug use.

No beliefs, of ultimate value? But Imagine claims that peace, brotherhood and unity are of ultimate worth, and that a heavenly utopia would arise, if they were properly valued.

Lennon’s beautiful [sic] song is, therefore, conceptually incoherent. Its lyrics also expose a lack of appropriate humility: How dare a multimillionaire satirize those who cannot imagine “no possessions”?

With what would Lennon replace religion, precisely? Atheists never deign to specify the nature of the godless order that would succeed Christian Civilization. Instead, they dare us to be sufficiently free-spirited and unconventional as to “imagine” how peaceful and beatific it would be, hoping that we will forget the inauspicious beginnings it had in Robespierre’s France or the gigantic prison of the Soviet Union. Not coincidentally, Lennon was himself a fulsome sycophant of the Marxist-Leninist regime and ideology, a crime for which he ought to have spent the rest of his life seeking absolution from the ghosts of its former inmates, if not from God. But apparently atheists have faith, even when it is flatly contradicted by the evidence of things seen.

Chesterton once wrote that for a reformer to be credible he must first accept and appreciate at least certain aspects of the prevenient “form”. But like their progressive and revolutionary brothers, atheists have never been comfortable with the helter-skelter, unregulated (i.e., natural) way in which human society has evolved over the millennia. It is odd that they who confer so much dignity upon an agency as mysterious as natural selection do not pause to consider that a similar mechanism is certainly at work in anthropology, especially in the sphere of social traditions and institutions (marriage, the family, worship). Since these have surely “evolved” with man over every stage of human development, you would think atheists would put some trust in the wisdom of that process rather than pronounce Nature an abject failure and wish that She had never begun the experiment in the first place. No less than raccoons, squirrels, and other noxious pests, I suppose, homo Christianus represents the culmination of untold centuries of adaptation and refinement; yet, while few Darwinian atheists would want to “imagine a world” without the former, they would be insouciantly delighted to see Christian Civilization die without a trace.

 

The flower-childish mind that can imagine a world without religion is obtusely credited with “idealism”, when the imaginer is ideationally savouring an act of gross vandalism – one that would tear down every Church and temple in the civilized world, and empty every museum. The imaginers are the epochal heroes of modernity, but consider the deeds that their imaginings have already fathered. The agents of the Terror must have first imagined a world without aristocrats, the Bolsheviks, without property owners. Our G-20 anarchists feel justified in breaking windows, no doubt, because they have imagined a perfect world without retail or banks. (Under full disclosure, I must confess to having imagined a world without pontificating rock musicians.) Lurking behind the “idealistic” face of reform is usually the adolescent desire to smash the form to bits.

Today, radical Islam has in common with Lennon that it has likewise imagined a world without religion: specifically, without Christianity and Judaism. In their avidity to eradicate every vestige of Christian culture, from crucifixes in hospitals to Christmas trees in public squares, atheist visionaries have allied themselves more closely with the Old Testament Prophets, the seventeenth-century Puritans, and the Taliban than they care to admit. In their defence, the Prophets, Puritans, and Taliban have been intolerant of only certain kinds of religion; the atheist is intolerant of every kind.

Yet the vaunted tolerance of secularists is invariably contrasted with the intolerance of believers. This is surely one of the falsest dichotomies and most self-serving myths of our time. One can hardly conceive of a more rigidly and comprehensively intolerant dogma than Marxist atheism, which sentenced its refuseniks to the work camp for a proliferant range of heresies none of which would have discomposed the sleep of even the most paranoid of inquisitors. C.S. Lewis made the point long ago that Christians have always recognized at least the partial truth of every other religion – Platonism, Stoicism, Mithraism, the Eleusinian mysteries, the cult of Isis and Osiris – in competition with it. Atheists, on the other hand, confidently declare that every religion throughout history has been completely wrong.

 

It was Chesterton again who remarked that the real crime of suicide is not killing oneself but killing the entire world. The suicide arrogantly and ungratefully consigns to oblivion everything and everybody else as worthless. The deicide consigns to oblivion not only the sensible world but the entire metaphysical cosmos of gods, spirits, and daimons, of myths, images, and symbols, with which man has co-existed and through which he has contemplated the perennial questions from the beginning. In dismissing them as worthless, the atheist imagines that he is wiser and better than the vast majority of all men who ever lived, including mankind’s greatest luminaries and benefactors; and with such invincible hubris, he would abolish the Civilization that religion has engendered, and start again.

The atheist order has given us labour camps, psychiatric prisons, AIDS, and abortion clinics. We are still waiting for it to bring forth its Homer, Dante, Michelangelo, or Bach. Atheism has produced no lasting literature or monumental art (besides the tawdry propaganda of Pravda or the colossal statues of Lenin, Mao, and Kim Jong-Il). The atheist idea has never inspired anything remotely like a sculpture by Praxiteles, a Gothic cathedral, or a fresco by Raphael. Its intellectual seed has nowhere blossomed into a fifth-century Athens, a twelfth-century Paris, or a fifteenth-century Florence. Anyone who travels to Moscow need only visit one of its Byzantine churches and then walk past a Stalinist apartment block to decide whether medieval theocracy or modern secular humanism is more intellectually vibrant or humane.

It is a measure of its cultural and intellectual barrenness that Dawkins and Hitchens must invoke the relatively obscure Pre-Socratic cosmologist Democritus as atheism’s founding Prophet, notwithstanding that Democritus’ own disciples, Epicurus and Lucretius, effectively conceded that the Master’s atomism was still-born without some galvanizing spiritual principle. Atomism turned out to be as still-born a philosophical movement as it was a cosmogonic theory, and so Dawkins and Hitchens are forced to turn to such better-known names as Jefferson and Einstein, whom they borrow on short-term lease from Deism, or Occam, whom they steal outright from Christianity. With such a sparse and undistinguished field of candidates, it is no wonder that as a party atheism has languished on the fringes.

To slightly update a question that Malcolm Muggeridge once asked, who would not rather be wrong with Plato, Plutarch, Origen, Augustine, Eckhardt, and Pico, than right with Karl Marx, Nietzsche, Wells, Huxley, Dawkins, and Lennon?

 

Is there no relation between the fruit and the tree? Hitchens seems to think that it is possible to appreciate the genius of Dante, Monteverdi, Shakespeare, Donne, and Milton while abominating their religious beliefs, as if their art came to birth not because of but in spite of their embarrassing Christianity. It’s his version, I suppose, of hating the sin and loving the sinner. But it does put one in a logical bind to have to explain how the most magnanimous, erudite, and humane minds (perhaps Hitchens will give me permission to call them spirits in this context) in the history of mankind could have simultaneously believed in and evangelized so risible and cruel a fraud as Christianity. How could the person who wrote Hamlet and Lear have subscribed to a faith so infantile as to have preached the Incarnation and Virgin Birth, and a moral doctrine so retrograde as to have condemned abortion and homosexuality as sins?

Like the rest of us, I have no knowledge as to whether or not God exists. I am considerably more certain that the image projected upon him by his various cultists has only a tenuous relation to his esse. The only truth of which I am absolutely convinced is that religion is the truest thing in the world. The best and most beautiful that man has ever wrought in the desert of human history has been nurtured, if not by God, then by the belief in God. If that is a delusion, then let us hope that we remain deluded. If recent history is any indication, the alternative is a dessicated wasteland.

Organized Irreligion…

and…

The Undergraduate History of Christianity…

In a brilliant essay, the late Joseph Sobran wonders why Christians, who have been incessantly “belabored” about the sins of organized religion, “have been so slow to turn the argument around and point to the record of what we may call ‘organized irreligion’ “.

It’s not as though atheism is sine macula. According to the highest estimates, the Inquisition claimed fewer than two thousand lives, and those over several centuries. In seventy years, by comparison, the guardians of Soviet atheist orthodoxy liquidated a hundred million of their own citizens for ideological impurity or belonging to a proscribed economic class.

Just or unjust, as Sobran notes, the Inquisition passed sentence against individuals for personal crimes, not membership in a group. Its authority was to that extent confined to the Christian-theological sphere, as opposed to caste, level of education, ancestry, ownership of property, private entrepreneurship, domestic arrangements, friends and associates, opinions about politics, and virtually everything else.

Given that all the drowned witches and burnt heretics in history have not yet come up to the foothills of the mountain of corpses heaped up by the post-religious Marxist State, one would think that the apostles of the atheist utopia and abominators of religion would have the decency to shut up. But as Sobran suggests, the narration of Christendom’s crimes against humanity has been for some time now a major cultural industry, especially in the media and the academy.

As a teacher in the university, I have been personally “belabored” on occasions beyond number by students retailing what I have come to call “the undergraduate history of Christianity”. It usually begins with the Evangelists’ defamation of the Jews (“endemic Christian anti-Semitism”), continues with the hierarchy’s suppression of doctrinal dissent and establishment of an “arbitrary” canon (“Christian theology as the instrumentality of political power”); moves on to the exclusion of women from the priesthood (“patriarchal misogyny”); next, we hear of forced conversions and baptisms; then the Crusades (“religious intolerance”); followed by the Inquisition; followed by Galileo’s heresy trial; followed by the Salem witch hunts (more misogny, as well as all of the above); followed by papal collusion with the Nazis (the Church’s congenital anti-Semitism, again); concluding with the sex-abuse scandal (“pedophilia”, but unrelated to homosexuality).

These, and only these, junctures in Christian history – for they know of no others – are recited by students with the alacrity of an incantational formula. When the undergraduate history of Christianity is repeated by writers of popular fiction such as Dan Brown and James Cameron – one is tempted to include Dawkins and Hitchens in this category –, one knows that one is in the presence of a contemporary culture-myth.

 

As others of their critics have observed, in enjoining its civilizational advantages, Dawkins and Hitchens never get beyond atheism as a Platonic concept, against which the inevitably mixed historical record of religion can hardly measure up. They make the same argument about atheism as that which Marxists have always made about socialism: like “true socialism”, atheism has apparently never been tried. Yet, even leaving aside the officially atheist Marxist State, the entire post-Enlightenment epoch has been a protracted experiment in organized irreligion.

Its record is not obviously more benignant than that of pre-modern theism. During those two centuries, more people died of unnatural causes than in the entire history of man’s inhumanity to man before them. I have already mentioned that the most murderous wars in history have been fought since the Enlightenment, and over anything but religious differences. As for the Church’s putative tyrannizing over private lives, her authority was always trifling by comparison to the tentacular grip and reach of the modern post-religious Welfare State. With their pitiful tithes, Byzantine Emperors and Patriarchs could only dream of the divine right of modern tax collectors to help themselves to more than fifty percent of a man’s labour. And at least the Inquisition’s thought police confined themselves to matters of theological doctrine, as opposed to our own human rights constabularies, who can arraign citizens for the crime of “offending” the orthodoxy of any interest group that demands immunity from criticism.

It is the oddly naive faith that (like “never-tried” socialism), “never-tried” atheism, once implemented, will usher in a world without end of tolerance and justice, that demands the absurd disavowal by Dawkins and Hitchens of any connection between atheism and the post-Enlightenment secular order, including Communism. Hitchens, for instance, dilates upon the rites and dogmas associated with the Communist cult of personality, and concludes that Communism was in fact just another religion(!) (Thus, even the atrocities of an officially atheist ideology can be imputed to a credulous belief in God.)

Hitchens’ argument is typical of the tortured logic of the anti-religious polemic, but in a way – one that Hitchens doesn’t understand, of course –, it’s rather compelling. Communism really was a religion (as Solzhenitsyn noted long ago), and atheism really is untried (and will continue to remain so.)

As Jung demonstrated over a lifetime of scholarship, the religious function of the psyche is a perennial and inalienable human endowment; what everything depends upon is its being authentically and salubriously engaged. Psychic energies that are not invested in the the linking back (i.e., religio) of the conscious ego with an immanent metaphysical order go dangerously underground, until they erupt into individual or collective neurosis. When they do, they propel into the empyreum everything from trivial earthly personalities to tawdry political ideologies. With the attrition of authentic religious forms, such as Christianity, the alternative isn’t atheism, but some ersatz theism – Marxism, Darwinism, or environmentalism –, with their ersatz saints and saviours – Mao, Kim, or Al Gore. Deracinated from the archetypes of an otherworldly heaven and hell, the post-religious consciousness attempts to create heaven on earth, and ends up, inevitably, reifying in the here and now the hell in which it no longer believes. How many more millions of lives would have been snuffed out in the cause of establishing the earthly paradise had it not been for the insistence by religions such as Christianity that the Kingdom of God is not of this world?

If the twentieth century was an experiment in post-religious political organization, it evidently failed. What that failure argues for is hardly the redemption from religion that Dawkins and Hitchens exhort and promise, but its opposite: a long-overdue liberation from the atheist delusion, with its deadly utopian fantasy of creating heaven on earth.